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IrlDEX ID DOCUI'!Sb^T BOOK NO. 9
I
CASE WIBSR 11 - GSP;L\fKFOREIGN OFFICE - COUNT ONE
GRr.SS AGAINST PEACE
AC-GRESSION AGAINST IKS U. S. A.
" tli'j dofond<?.nts wore principals in, accessories to, ordered,
abetted, took a consenting part in, wore connected 7d.th plans and enter
prises •invoM.ng, and v/ore ncanbcrs of organizations and groups connected
7d.th the cormrdssion of Crincs against Peace,"
LIST OF mTiES
Anau, Japanese Vice Foreign 'linister
Boettichcr, General, Gcrnan iH.litarj-- Attache in
vroshington
Bohlc, State Secretary (Special), Berlin
Diockhoff, former German Mbassador, V/ashington '
(19)41 in Foreign Office, Berlin)
Erdmannsdorff, Politi-cal Dirigent (from July l9Ul
in Berlin)
Kcpplor, State Secretary (Special), Berlin
Konoye, Prince, Japanese Prcmior, resigned October I6,
Kurusu, Special Japanese Ambassador and emissary to
• Washington
!.htsuoka, Jap.anosc Foreign !anistor until July 19Ul
Mcissner, State I-dnistor, Berlin
Nomura, Admiral, Japanese Ambassador in '^""ashington
Oshima, former General, Japanese Ambassador in Berlin
Ott, former General, Gorman Ambassador in Tokyo
Ritter, Special Ambassador, Berlin
I
Thomscn, German Charge d'Affairos in Washington
Togo, Jap<ancse Foreign -Ilnister, succeeded Toyoda
' i 18 Ocrtobor 19Ul
To^o, Japanese Premier from October 16, 19UI
Toyoda, Japanese Foreign ITlnistor, succeeded fiatsuoka
in July 19)41
Weizsaecker, Sta.to Secretary, Berlin
19U1
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'exhibit No, ^oci^ent
NG-307U
Description of Document
Mamorandun from vyeizsaecker' s files
of-September 28, i9U0, -with his
trinpevJTitten signature* Copies sent
to Ribbentrop^s Bureau, to V'roermann,
and others. The memorandum is con-
corned v-ath '^•'"eizsaecker's talk v/ith
the Russian Ambassador in Berlin on
the -Tripartite Pact,
Describing his reply to the Russian
Ambassador's inquiry regarding the
"Tripartite Pact, Weizsaecker re
marks.
'During the discussion,
I kept to the contents
of the cable to Moscovr
on the "b'renty-fifth of
this montti, whereby, in
stead of naming America
as the po7fer at v;hich
this Treaty v;as aimed, I
used the general phrase
that it v/as a warning
directed towards tho
democratic powers,"
E'TxUSIS: bfoizsaccker's and other
defendants knowledge of German
government's anti-U, S, policy as
Gai'13^ as I9I1-O,
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Exhibit No, Docuraont No,_" pcscription of DogunGn_t Page No.
NG-U369 Cable from f-Illitary Attache General
Boetticher and Charge d* Affaires
Tlaomsen in Washington to the Foreign
Office in Berlin, dated February 26,
I9UI. Ton copies distributed, to
Ribbontrop, Wcizsaocker, Rittcr,
7^_Grraann, This copy taken from the
files o"f Wcizsaocker,
In the cable it is pointed out that
as a result of the speech of the
Fuehrer the nerves of English and
American leaders arc gravely affected.
"Nothing is knovm about
the futiu'o moasiires of
Japan, but one is im
pressed by Japan's de
mand to rule the entire
Oceania and the papers
are publishing maps about
it's enormous extension.
The question comes up
"tTith respect to the
British Isles whether the
Fuehrer is going to limit
himself to a war of block
ade, or is going to invade.
One looks tovfards Spain,
to".vards Greece, to the
Persian Gulf, and tho Suez
Canal, and behind big
vv'ords, one scarcely can
hide tho fear of coming
events abo\it which, after
all, one can't predict any
thing, "
"Tlic English are bringing
the report that they arc
forti'f^ng Tdth planes
every front in the Far East,
in the TG.ddle East, in the
Meditciranoan and in England,
because new pilots from tho
Empire training plan, and
pianos, delivered by
America, arc available in
abundance. That is all
bluff, if England does not
split her forces. The
truth about tJic pilots and
the Anorj.can planes is
shown in ny reports.
"Then camq Roosevelt's new
dcmnd for over 3 billion
dollars, in particular for
aviation equipment. As if
under present conditions
that could bo of any use,
and have results in 19Ulv "
Defendants are advised about
aDregod werJcness of the U-, S,
^2-
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Noi DociLnDnt No. Description of Doctncnt Page No.
NG-UUhS C-.blo. fron Piibbcptrop to Anbassador
Ott in Toyko of ^^ebruary 27, 19Uii
( '• taken fron ^.roizsaockor' s filo and
distributed to Wocmann and Rittor.
P.ibbcntrop orders Ott to
"use all available neans
to induce Japan to take
possession of Singapore
by a surprise blow as soon
as possible,"
E"IPKASIS: Policy of the Gorman govern-
incnt to press Japan into the war.
Knowledge of Foreign Office defendants
of this policy.
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S-'dii-bit No, Docuncnt No, Description of Docur:iGnt Pci^e No,
NGt.m;U9 Gable f^om Ribbentrop to Ambassador
Olt in Ib^/ko of February 28, 19Ul|
taken from the files of Vcizsacckcr,
Conios sent to Woormann and Ritter,
Ribbentrop reports about the
conference vd-th the Japanese
Ambassador Oshima of February 23,
19l4.1> in Fuschl,
Ribbontrop opened the
talk by giving a summary
of the general political
situation. To force
England to beg for peace
Japan's cooperation -vvas
important. She should
attack Singapore at once,
if at all possible v/ith-
out declaration of war
so as to end the war
quiclcly and to keep the
U, S, out of it.
Oshima ansr/cred that the
preparations for Singapore's
occupation vfo^old bo
firlshed in !.!ay, but pre
parations for war should
be made against the U.S,
also.
Ribbontrop remarked that
the Philippines-project
would bo bettor postponed
and a lightning attack on
Singapore alone carried
out immediately. As one
of tlic most important
reasons for this suggest
ion Ribbentrop raentlcncd
that America v/ould stay
out of the vrar because" of
her unproparodnoss and in
order not to risk her
fleet west of Hawaii,
Contents of this conference vfere
dispatched to Gorman embassies and
legations, sec document PS-l83li,
EliPHASIS; Decisive attempts of German
policy to push Japan into the war
against England at a moment v/hen the
United Sta.tcs arc not prepared.
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Hand''--Yitton no'bes of von Etzdorf, tho
Forijign Office liaison irrith the Arny_, of
Fcbruar;"" 28, 19Ul, discovered in Foreign
Office files» Reference is viado to
Japan:
"2.
Tolcgrar from Hibben-tarop
to Ott
'Please use every
means at your dis
posal to cause
Japan to capture
Singapore ?.s soon
as possible*'
Contra Japan prococc?ang
against Singapore: Ex
tension of v;ar (United
States of Anorical)
making difficult tiio
poacc settlement (hungry''
Jap.an at iiio peace table)*
Pro; Iloral effect, "pdng
up of English forces
(Jap<an instead of Ii^,ly),
Disturbing imports to
England,
Return gift; Dutch East
Indies,
'Hor/cvcr, open talk in reference
to our plans regarding Russia,
(St. S)"
St. S« refers to Weizsaccker.
Etzdorf note of March 3* Etzdorf
refers to the conversation of Ribbcntrop
v/i-tii Oshima and that Ribbcntrop told hin
"In order to finish tho "war
quickly and to force England
to ask for peace cooperation
aith Japan is of importance.
In her ovm Interest, Japan
should attack as soon as
possible. Decisive blwv
against Singcaporo in order
destroy key position of Eng-^
land in Eastern Asia and to
secure Japan the position in
East Asia, ^vhich she can only
acquire in this v/ar. Capture
of Singapore should taJco
place v;lth blitz speed and If
possible vdthout declaration of
v/ar but in the midst of peace
in order to contribute to a
quick end of the u'r.r and to
keep the U,S,A, out of the
to
war,
• 1- Yi ii' f in
Ho, Docuncnt Ho, Dcscrintion of Pocuriont
HG-lOiS^b
(Gon't)
Answer of Oshima:
"I will do everything in
order to effect such a
policy, "
EfPPiASIS; General knowledge of Foreign
Office officials of policy of pushing
Japan into the v/ar. Foreign Office in
forms I'i.my of this policy.
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Exhibit No. Docunont No; PoGcription of Do'Cumont Page No,
PS-I83U
(USA-129)
Foreign Office directive of March 2,
19U1 signed b3'- Pibbcntrop and initialed
I[2.\^-£L9£]S5£5 informing five German
cnhassics and ten German missions,
most confidentially, on tlie conver
sation betivoon Riblrentrop and
Ambassador Oshima on February 23,
i9ia.
In this conversation Japan Tras urged
to enter the war because this would
moan a
"decisive hlovr against the
core of the British Empire
....A surprise attack by
Japan \ms the thing needed
to keep Amcrico. out of th«
vrar, America which has not
reamed as irot and would not
be very v.illing to take the
risk of exposing its fleet
west of Hawaii, then could
do it even less.,,It seemed
to bo in the interest of
J<apan to secure for herself
vfhilc the vrar v/as still on
such a position in Eastern
Asia for the coming novr
order in the -world as she
desires to have in her hand
at the time when poacc is
made. Ambassador Oshima
agreed full?/ v.'ith ttiose linos
of reasoning and declared
that ho v.'ould do everything,
to carry out this policy, "
"Tho Reich Foreign Minister
then mcntionod that if
ATaorica declared war because
of Japan's entrance into the
-Wear this v/ould be a sign that
she had had anyhcnw the in
tention to enter the war sooner
or later. Even if it might
bo better to prevent this,
such an entrance into the war
would bo in no way decisive
for the reasons already given
and could no longer impede
the final victor?/ of the
member states of the li'i-
partLtc Pact."
E'TKASIS/ Cooperation of Vfeizsacckcr
in pushing Japan into war.
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Exhibit. No; PoQti^^ont No, Description of Doc\Ancnt Pago No.
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FS-1877
(USA-.152)
•ionorondu'":'! froT^i Foreign Office files,
no signature, of "larch 29, 19Ul, on
conversation bcb/vcen Ribbontrop and
llatsuoka. In tJiis conversation
Ilatsuoka stated that
".•.the Japanese Navy re
garded the danger' of the
English Navy as very unin-
portant and vras also of
•the view that in an en
counter vfith the American •
Navy the latter could be
annihilated. However she
(the Japanese Navy) was
afraid that the Americans
would not expose their
fleet to battle so that
conflict vd-tli the U, S,
ni^it extend for five
years. People in J<apan
wore very uneasy about
this.
"The Reich Foreign Ilinister
responded that America could
not do anything against
Japan if Singapore were
captu^'cd, "
SL!PH/iSIS: Foreign Office policy to
push Japan into v/ar by telling hor
the U, S, is not ready for v/ar.
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Exhibit No» Docuncnt Description of Podtiicnt
NG-li303
' . i.
Momorandun fron •'Tcizsaockcr's o*evn files
dated April 3^ 19hl, with his iypc-
ivritten signature. Ton copies dis
tributed, anong others to Hitter,
''^^oemann, Srdiaannsdorff,
In this nonoranduri. to Ribbontrop,
Woizsaccker suggests that Gemany
should act in such a way as to
appear always on the defensive
ivith regard to the United States,
"It is our concern to
play the gone of fixing
the guilt in such a way
that step by stop we
appear as the ones attack-^
ed. Hiis is necessary
in consideration of our
allies, especially Japan,"
This point v/as to be kept in mind in
the dre^ting of protest notes agsainst
tlio United States,
E!.IPE.\SIS: Tfoizsaocker vd.th knowledge
of otiicr defendants plays the gone
of placing v/ar guilt on the United
StatCiS,
' fr'riiii'il'i^ai'illiiiriiiBlkli i'iii»'<i'ii' MiiM inntr • •
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Sxhibit No* Document No^_ Description of Document page No.
PS - 1581 Notes on conference between the
(USA~33) Fuehrer (Hitler) and the Japanese
Foreign Minister Matsuoka, in the
presence of the Reich Foreign Minis
ter and of state Secretary I'leissner^
in Berlin, on April k, 1941» Has
tjnpei'nritten signature of Schmidt of
RibbentropJs office.
Matsuoka reported about his talk
vdth the Duos 'who had told him
"You have to be clear about
the importance of your
enomy. Enem;s'- No, 1 is Amer
ica, and Soviet Russia is'
only in the second place,,•"
Hatsuoka said further,
Japan will do every
thing in her efforts to
avoid a war vdth the U.S.
In case she (japan) should
make the decision for a
coup against .Singapore the
Japanese Navy hae of course
also to make preparations
for a war against the
The Fuehrer pointed out
'I,,,that Germany too re
garded a conflict vfith the
U.S. as undesirable, but
had already taken the"possi
bility into account,.,"
In the course of the conference the
Fuehrer then emphasized that
",,,if Japan should be
involved'in a conflict vrith
the U.o.j Germany would isnt*
mediately accept the conse
quences. It v/as immaterial
vrith vrhom the U.S, would
become involved in conflict'
first, Germany or Japan,
"As regards Japanese-
American relationship, Hat
suoka explained further
that he has always declared
in his country, that sooner "
or later a war vrith the
United States would be un
avoidable, if Japan continued
to drive forvrard as at present.
In his opinion this conflict
would begin rather sooner
than later. His argument'
went on, vdiy should Japan,
therefore, not decisively
strike at the right moment
and take the risk upon her
self of a fight against
America? Just thus vrould
she perhaps avoid a war for
-9-
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generations^ particulai'ly
if she gained predominance
in the South Seas, There
are, to be sure, in Japan
many who hesitate to follow
these trends ^f thought,
Hatsuoka v/as considered in
those circles a dangerous
man v;ith dangerous thoughts.
He, hovfever, stated that, if
japan continued along her
present path, she vfould one
day have to fight anyv^ay and
that this would then be
under less favorable circtim—
stances than at "present.
"The Fuehrer replied
that he could vrell under-
stand'the situation of Kat*
suoka, because he himself
had been in similar situations
(the" clearing of the Rhine-
land, declaration of sovereign
ty of armed forces)# He too
had been of the- opinion that
he had to exploit favorable
conditions and accept the
risk fd' an anyhovf unavoidable
fight at a time vfhen ho him
self was still young and
full of vigor, Hov: right he
had been in his attitude had
been piroven by events, Europe
novf vras free. He would not
hositste a moment to reply in
stantly^ to ary widening cf the
war, be" it by Russia, bo it by
America, providence favored
those vfho do nOt let dangers
come upon'them, but who bravely
face them,"
E2.iPHASI3; I'cissnor and Foreign Office
defendants assured of Gerivan help to
Japan in case -^f conflict.
•i iirri'^Viiiifytrfi 1
u. I;
Nom poettracnt- Ko^ Posej'lb'b.ori of bdeuncpt Pago No.»
' Confci'cni© mcnordndun, T/iih the type*"(USAiil^j) irriticti fttgnnii^a of-Schiiit, oi
Ribl)cfitJ'Op*fe oxf: ,de), about tlic con^
fel'otibe tjeti-'/ceh t
"liniater Ribbcrttt
hs ii^oi-Gign
^op and" the Jajjanetie
Foreign ^b-nistor Matsuoka, in Berlin,
April 19hl»
'In conclusion, the Reich
Foreign riinistcr once
again sumnarized the points
he viantod Ilatsuoka to take
back to Japan ivith him from
his trip;
Germany had already won
the war. With the end of
this year the world would
realize this. Even England
would have to concede it, if
it had not collapsed before
then, and America would
/>•,' ' • . also have to resign herself
I'-V
Vi
to this fact.
"2. Iherc were no.conflict-
interests between Japan and
•'.Germany, The future of .
both countries could be
, regulated for the long run4 ... basis that Japan
• . should predominate in the
I
Far East, Italy and Germany
in Europe and Africa,
"3, Whatever might happen,
Germany would ivin the war.
But it would hasten victory
if Japan v/-ould enter the
v;ar. Such an entry into 1he
YFCir wes undoubtedly more in
the interest of Japan than •
in 1^at of Germany, for it
offered a unique opportunity
v/hich would hardly return
again, for the fulfillment
of the national objectives
of Japan, a chance 'which
would make It possible for
her to play a really loading
role in East Asia,
'^^latsuoka replied that ho
himself could only repeat
that he had long been of
the opinion that every
nation would be offered an
opportunity only once in a
thousand years, Japan was
confronting such an opportunity,
and she would have to assume
the risk connected with it.
She would have to act
decisively at the right
-10^
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PS-1582
(Con't)
nomcnt in order to take
advantage of this unique
opportunity."
E^^ipI-iASIS: Foreign Office policy of
pushing Japan into the war.
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Spdiibit No, Document Noj_ Descfglption of Doctgieht^
NG-UU22a
Papc No«,_
m4\h22b
NG-lil;22c
NG-.Uii22d
Cablo froin Geman Amfessador Ott in
Tokyo to tko Gcrnhn foreign I>ti.nistei*
in Berlin, dated ?ky S, 19lil> taken
from ^•'^'"cizsaockar'g files. Copies
distributed, anong others, to ^"^oornann,
Rittor and Erdnannsdorff,
Informs on American-Japanese negotiations
for a peaceful settlement,-
Cable from Ott in Tokyo to the Reich
Foroign ?-finistor, dated yiay 6, 19ifL,
taken from Voizsaecker^s files. Copies
to Woormann, Rittcr, Erdmannsdorff.
Givos information about Ott's conversation
y/ith Ilatsuoka in Tclcyo about possible
peaceful settlement of American-Japartese
problems, Ott points out that he tried
again to direct Japonose policy tovrards
Singapore in opposition to the American
diplomatic maneuvers,
Cable from Ott in Tokyo to the Rcicli
Foreign Minister, dated 'lay 11, 19hl,
taken from Weizsacckcr^ s files; copies
were sent to V.bormann, Rittor, Erdmanns-
dorf,
Ott reports that ho has informed Matusoka
very enorgGtically that the Gorman govern
ment coiild not agree to Japanese dealings
yd.th ''Washington vdthout having received
the opinion of the othor Axis powers.
Telegram from '""oizsaockcr to Ribbcntrop,
vjlth Woizsaockor' 5 tj^powritten signature
and taken from "'''oizsaockcr's files, dated
Hay 1?, 19iil.
^>Wcizsac-ckcr givos his opinion on the
Amcrican-Japanosc dealings:
'Every political treaty
bctv/oon Japan and the
U.S.A. is undesirable at
the present time. The
present draft of the
treaty, however, would
involve Japan turning
away from us. It would
leave the b-attloficld
against England and the
U.S.A, to us alone. The
Tripartite Pact v/ould be
discredited. Directly
too anti-Gorman is, in
the closing sontonce in
Roman Numeral two, the
sanctioning of U.S. help
to England,
-11-
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Exhibit No4 Docunont Ho4 Description of Document Pago No,
NG-l4l|.22 d "As the treaty draft
(Con't) is already in ""Washing
ton, it has already
had a damaginc effects
The effort must bo
made to attack it now,
after it has boon dravm
up, so that tlic treaty
is never concluded,
"In the event that it
should not be possible
to prevent the treaty,
carc vfould have to be
taken that Japan is,
practically speaking,
again brought into line.
The very least would be
that Japan develops its
help to Gemany accord
ing to the sane principles
as the USA help to England, "
MG-U.'j22e Telegram from Ribbentrop to Gorman
Ambassador Ott in "'"lashingtcn, dated
June 11, 19hl. Copy taken from
Wcizsaockor's files. Copies sent to
Wocrnann, Rittcr, Erdmannsdorff,
Pvibbcntrop informs Ott about the
status of the Japanesc-A-ncrican
ncgotiaticns. Ho denounces Nomura
whom he alleges wants Amorican-
- Japa,nesG underste.nding, and warns
against him, Ott is instructed to
strengthen Matsuoka in his positivo
attitude against the U,S,
E'ipH/iSI3; VAeizsacckcr is very much
afraid, that Japancse-U.S, negotiations
night result in tan understanding, and
suggests all means of diplomacy be
used against such an understanding.
His Foreign Office collaborators have
kno\vlodgc of and participate in this
policy*
-11a-
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KG-LliJ^Ua
• -xo:
Tolcgr.?:i fron Gcfnr.n A'ni^dssador Ott
of Tokyo to Reich Foreign T'linistor^
dated Vicrj 6, 19Ulj taken fro;n the
files of h^oornann and initio.lcd by
Woornann, Copy sent to Rittorj
Ott advises the Foreign Office of the
results of his ccnforonco v;ith T-kitsuoka
in connection vdth the United States'
proposal that Japan join her in a
secret entente to naintain the status
quo in tic Far Ea.st#
Cable froia. Geman Anbassa,dor Ott,
Tc.kyo to Foreign !IinistGr in
Berlin of l^.lay 10, 19^1. Copy-
taken from ^'^ocrpacrfa files, also
initialed by Wo^rmann. Copy sent
to Hitter#
This cable reports that Jiatsuoka had
inquired whether any answer had been
received from Berlin as to the Araerican
proposal and that Jlatanoka had expressed
the hope that the answer vrould not be
long in corning since the Japanese
Ambassador in Washington vfas being
pressed for va reply by Secretary Hull,
In the interim -iatsuoka proposed to
instruct the Japanese /Ambassador in
Washington to inquire whether ihncrica
was prepared to pledge herself: l)
not to enter the European war and 2)
to persuade China to negotiate directly
vdth Japan v/ithout the participation
of "the U, S, In that event, Japan
would bo prepared to discuss the U, S,
proposal.
Ott reports that v/hcn he
"pointed out for a second,
time "
that the /American proposal was obviously
designed to deter Japan from taking any
action in the South Pacific, and more
particularly against Singapore,
I'latsuoka had declared that ho had no
intention of permitting his hands to bo
tied so far as the Pacific Ocean was
concerned. He v/ould certainly not
roliovo the /moricans of their anxiety
for the safety of British possessions
in the Pacific, Ott then observed that
the tine might como v/hen ^kicricca's
actions must bo considered as attacks
despite the fact that tliorc had been
no formal dveclaration of war, Matsuoka
had replied that, in that event, the
terms of the pa^t would be binding o*
Japam^
-rlfi.
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Exhibit No, Docxincnt No. Description of Docuncnt Pago No,
HCr-)4.)j.^}^C Tclcgr-an fron Ribbentrop to Ott in
dntcd May 11, 19Ul. Copy
tr?.kon fron Wocrmann files, contains
ycormann^s initial. Copj- also sent"
to Rittor,
TGlcgrara instructs Ott to transmit to
•latsuoka the follcAving information as
to Germany's position on the U. S,
proposal to Japan;
The Reich Government thr.nlcs the
Japanese Government for informing it of
the proposal put forth by the United
States and v.dshes to state its position
on this important matter very frankly.
Basically the struggle in which
Germany and Italy find themselves is a
life-and-doath struggle,upon which the
fate of Japan depends, as well.
Should Germany and Italy be defeated,
then Japan v^rould find herself face to
face with an overpowering Anglo-
Saxon coalition which would undoubtedly
also include Soviet Russia, and
possibly France, and which would
cffcctivcl7/ put an end to any attempt
by Japan to gain Lebonsraun in the
Far East. It is obvious that it is of
the utmost importance to prevent the
U, S. from entering the war, but
7/hcther or not this T/ill be possible
depends entirely upon the- attitude of
that country herself. Should it be
the intent of tho loading figures in
the U. S, to lead America into tho
T/ar, then their first course would be
to pave thd wa^/ for an attack on
Germany and Italy by vjnakoning the
Tripartite Pact and isolating those
two nations.
On the other hand, if the President
had advanced the proposal for purely
tactical rccasons, in order to create
insecurity in Japan, then all the more
reason for being just as clover in re
pulsing such an attempt.
In view of those considerations, concludes
Ribbentrop, tho Reich govcrnracnt vrould
suggest that tho Japanese reply embody
thcj follovdng points: l) The Jap.onosc
government is interested in all attempts
to prevent tho vn.r from spreading
further but regrets that she has noted
evidence of un-neutral acts on tho port
of the Americans and 2) should the
American government actually intend to
avoid entering tho war and also to
cease such un-noutral activities, then
the Jap<anoso governinent v/ould be
pleased to give the proposal further
consideration. In view of tho im
portance of tho matter to the Ti'i-
N
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Sxtiiblt Ko, Docunicnt No« Doscription of Document
IJCt-IiIisLc partite Pact the Reich govei^nment would
(Con"'t) appreciate an opportunity to pass on
•Uie Japanese reply to the U. S. before
its dispatch.
SI'iFHi'lSI.S; Fot^eign Office defendants
inforraed about tJ, S»-Japanose
negotiations, cooperate in sa.botaging
them.
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E:-diib:.t No» Dccunont N:-., Doscription of Docment
MG-.h398 A
IIG-U398 B
NG-U396 0
Tologran from tho Gcman Legation in
Mc::ico 'tc Foreign Office in Berlin,
signed Richard and Huedt (Goman
}-!inister to Mexico), dated April l6,
19lil,, taken frc.!;i the files cf tho
Political Division. (Chief
nann. Deputy Erdaiannsdorff)
'Received $^0,000. For-
7/arding arranged. "
Tologran. from Gcman Minister in
Mexico Ruedt to Foreign Office
Berlin, dated Mexico, April 23,
19Ul« Ihis telegram was dis
tributed in seven copies,'omcng
others to Ribbentrcp, ''''"cizsacckorj
^'j'oornann, Rittor.
This cable gives infomation about
Gcman sabatoge agents, ximong them,
as number four. Agent Rekowski,
working '/ath a dynamiting organi
zation
'in the U, S, for sabo
tage in munition plants
rnd on ships."
Cable from German Minister in Mexico
to Foreign Office Berlin, of April
29, 19Ul^ informing that tr^o of the
agents mentioned in NG-).i398 B have
departed to Japan,
UG-Ii.398 D Cable to Foreign Office in Berlin
from German ^linistcr Rucdt in
Mexico, dated Hay 2, 19Ul. Cable
distributed in the Foreign Office
in ten copies, among others to
Rib^bontrcp, Mcizsacckcr, '^ •foormcann.
Hitter and Erdmannsdcrff.
NG-U398 E
'Tlie Gcraan Hiiixstcr vrarns that those
agents endanger our policy in Mexico,
Cable from Gorman LUnistcr Rucdt in
!'Icxico to the Foreign Office Berlin
of )!lay 2, 19i4l« Tv7o conies distributed
.in the Foreign Office,
Berlin is informed that a new Gcman
agent, who is a Mexican citizen, will
bo active and that comunications will
bo forwarded through the legation. Do-
tails are given about names of other
agents, their cover addresses, etc.
The Gcman Minister informs the
Forei.gn Office that ''d0,000 arc al
ready paid to the agents and o30,000
more arc in his hand for future pay
ment.
-13-
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Exhibit Nc. Docmcnt Ho, DGscrj.pticn of 'Dccvj.icnt Page Nc«
NG-.U398 F
I-
Cable from Gcrnan T'2.nistcr Ruodt In
Haxico to tho Forcien Office^ dated
!Iay 29, 19h.l, Ton copies distributed
in the- Foreign Office* to Ribbcntrop,
h'olzsacckcr, Rittcr, Vroennann, and
Er'.iaannsdor ff.
Gorrian ?Iinister Ruodt forwards
comunicaticn from the agent v/ork-
ing in the U»S.A, v;ho is at present
in Mexico,
"••t*.Latost successes:
Merchant Marine in Boston
destroyed through fire.
Forest fires in Jersey,,.,
Dr, Schclz, Boston (Ger-
nan Consul General) should
be contacted, "
It is .further nentionod ihat h^jOOO
have boon paid under tho condition
that newspaper clippings are to be
forwarded as proof for the action
pcrforncd,.
K':tpr:A3IS: Gernian Foreign Office
defendants knowledge of and parti-
cipatien in sabotage acts in the
U, S, before Pearl Harbor,
.I • ' '
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Exhibit No, Document No, Description cf Document
PS-2897 Cop7 of a telegram from the Reich
Foreign !linister to Ott in Tokyo^ dated
July 10, 19iil, taken from l^oermann^s
file and initialed and underlined by
him, Ccopies to Bohle, Keppler, Ritter
and others.
'Ribbcntrop requests-an* imnediate
comprehensive analysis of the situation
in Tokyo, '.Tit; cm-hasis-on the following
pcin.ts, all -^f ^/hich arc underlined in
tlie- text, by '•bor-iann;
1, Current relations between Japan
and the United States:
2, The reaction of the Japanese
public, and in particular, of in
fluential military and government
circles, to the United States
occupation cf Iceland,
Ribbentrop expresses the fear that
Japan might engage in the "short
sighted" policy of coming to some
understanding ^'d-th America, He
warns,
"I need not emphasize
that tliis, as I have
already indicated,
vrould be a very short
sighted policy, and
' tliat by follovring it,
Japan night miss Idio
great historic, never
to bo repeated,
opportunity, "
Ribbcntrop expresses faiidi in Japanese
foreign policy. He is certain that
Japan would not irdss
"this unique opportunity
to solve the Russian
question, as well as
to expand to the south
and settle the Chinese
question,,,,,it is
naturally in our ovm
interests that Japan
should want to expand
to the south,.,,,,and
every move toward ex
pansion by Japan will
be fundanontallj'"
approved by us, "
(Tois passage is underlined and marked
for special attention by I'-oomann,)
Ribbcntrop instructs Ott to use all
moans at his command to bring Japan
iniv^ the war against Russia,
-Ib^
Pare No,
Exhibit Mc» Dccunont No_* Doscripticn of DcCTmpnt Pago No»
PS-26?7 "The soonct* the bettePi*'
(Con't)
B* I'Tocrmann' s copy, initialed hy him
of ^"imbassaclor OttU reply from Tokyo
-of July lli, .I9UI tc the cable of
J'\ly 10. Copies distributed to at
least ton Foreign Office desks,
anong then Rittcr.
Ott reports that Jap?.ncse-Ainorican
relations are characterized by in
creasing tension, and that there is
the general feeling in high Japanese
military and naval circles, that
• Japan can only strengthen her position
in the Far East in opposition to the
British and Americans* (This is
underlined by ]Tocrmann»)
Ott furtlicr discusses the matter of
the delay in the .ansv/cr of Ribbentrop's
"personal message" to Matsuoka and
then goes on tc say that he is con
centrating all his efforts toward
achieving a Japanese declaration of
Avar on Russia at the earliest
possible nomonl^ using Ribbcntrop^s
arguments (see document a) and that
ho believes his efforts will bo
success fu.l.
EFFI-L";SIS: Reveals further knov/lcdgc of
and participation by defendants in
cndoavcrs to promote a Japanese entry
into war against U*. S, and Russia,
-»liia-
'
Exhibit Nc« bocTmcnt Ho, Doscription of PociliiGnt
NG-1U3U Mote fron the files of V'rcizsaeckGr^
Td.th his typewritten signature,
dated August 11, 19lil, directed to
Ribbentrop, suggesting that Roosevelt's
cappoal for peace should be distorted
by- derogatory publicity.
h'"oizsaeckcr reports to Ribbentrop
that he has i-ecoived infomation
froa Vichy, as well as from ""^ashing-
toa, tliat President Roosevelt is
planning to launch an appeal for
poacG. 'Tcizsaeckor vrritos that the
Foreign Office should
"....in ny opinion, con
sider Yfhethcr this
allegedly impending
Roosevelt action could
bo hindered sonchcw
through a counter
campaign in the press.
I rccomricnd that Dr.
Hogcrlc bo asked to
nako suggGstions."
IT'tPHASIS: Indicates ""'^cizsacckcr's
efforts to sabotage U. S. plans for
peacoful sottloncnt vd-iii Japan.
-15-
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Exhibit No* Doc"ument Nb
PS-3733A
PS-3733B
PS^3733C
DeBcription of Dpeuitient
Jaxanese minutes of an inter
view held on August 19, 1941,
"between Japanese "Vice Minis
ter Amau and German Am'bassa—
dor Ott,
"...Ott advanced the idea
that it would be to the
advantage of Japan also
if at this time she
attacked Russia from the
East,"
Japanese condensed report of
a conference held between the
German *hnbassador Ott and the
Japanese "Vice Minister Amau
on August 29, 1941.
The Vice Minister Informed
Ott that he had received the
impression
"...that the American
authorities are pre
pared to enter into
negotiations in order
to break the deadlock."
The answer of Ambassador Ott
"As usual, America will
try to Q-aln time by begin
ning nee-otiations with'
Japan, .^nd meanwhile will
put forth still greater
efforts to carry out her
objectives. Therefore, I
think that precautions
must be taken against
America's scheme to pre-
lone: these negotiations,
so that this might work
to her advantage,"
Page No.
Condensed report of a conference
between Foreign Minister Toyoda
and German Ambassador Ott on
August 30, 1941.
"ott: In the notice sent
to the German government
on the Snd July, the state
ment is made that Japan is
making preparations for
every possible eventuality
in her relations with Russia
and America, but are the
•16-.
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PS-3733C
cont'd.
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intentions 6f the Japan
ese efivernment still the
sane today? Is there any
possibility that Japan
may particioate in the
Russo-G-erman war?
"Toyoda: Japan's prepara
tions are now making head
way, and it will take more^^
time for their^completion.
Emphasis'i Shdws Foreign Office
efforts to discourage Japan in
acbeptine- a peaceful ablution
with Ui S»
—iCa-
< <
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Sxhlblt IIo, Docuncnt Bo, Poscri-ption of Dccuncnt' Pap-o No«,
NG-3U38 Copy of a Top Secret To^-ctypG fron
the Gernan Naval iVttrachc in Toyko,
Tolcycj dated 22 AUfpist 19Ul, fcr-
v/arded by Rittor, over his hand-
T.Tittcn si^rnature, to the Foreign
i'dnistcr.
Iho Tclct^"pcj vfhich Rittcr desig
nates as "a roiarkablc report",
gives the opinion of Japanese naval
officers. According to then Japan
will not o-ttack Russia and hopes to
avoid war vrlth England and iho
United States, •vihilo moving south
into Thailand and Indo-China to
secure valuable rav«r materials and
shift her base of attack against
Buma rjid Singapore. The next step
would be to attack Manila and
occun^;* the Dutch East Indies.
It is pointed out that this only
roflocte the opinion of the Navy,
and that the Japanese /irmy nay
not necessarily agree.
E!!PH/'.3IS*. Shows Fitter's connection
vrith and knowledge of the Japanese
war plans. Also inter-governmental
struggle in Japan, and that the
fined- decision as urged by the Ger
mans was not as yet made.
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ExI-dblt Docti^.nn-fc l--o_» Dsgcrlption of PocumGnt
NG-ij.366 Gable from Gcman Ambassador Ott in
Tokyo, to the Foreign Ministry in
Berlin, dated August 30, 19hl;
fifteen copies made, and distributed
to Ribbentrep, ''•'rcizsaeckcr, Bohle,
"'oermann, Fr"dnannsdorff, and others»:f.r
Ott reports on his interview Trith the
Japanese Foreign i!b.nistor, to vhom he
pointed out the recent v/cal^ening of
the Tnilitary reserves of the Soviet
Union, and the unpreparednoss cf
American armament. He told the
Japanese Foreign I'tlnistcr that Japan
could proceed, without risk, to talco
the necessary steps to protect her
position and prestige in the For
Fast,
*'??y request to hav
text of the Konoyc
message Toyoda did not
fulfill.
the
"Toyoda was during the
conversation very re
served, as is his 7/ay,
As I learn, the useful
ness of the Konoyc
message is much dis
cussed in Army and Navy
circles. Although in
view of the attitude of
the Konoyc G-ovcrnmcnt
one cculd have expected
efforts to establish a
modus Vivendi, cvon if
temporary, ivith tho
United States, still the
nev;s cf a message of the
Prime i\!inistcr to
Roosevelt was uiicxp®cted,
Tho play given this
step in the American press
has been painfully received
here and has also left in
govormcnt circles the
uncertain feeling that
possibly other effects
than tho ones hoped for
may result, Tho govern
ment is trying to koop
the press treatment to
a limited scope therefore.
Ott"
HT'lPH-'iSISs Shc;7s efforts of Foreign
Office defendants to discourage poaec
and prcmoto war by Japcon vis-a^vifl
the United States,
••iC—
Page No,
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"tdrrplw iTc» Pocv:^\jL--b l"o» Doscri^rySiori or f^pcv>rior>-b pc!r?e Fo^
MG 4370 Mem.org with the typev/ritten signa^
ture of%ei2saecker and initialed by
Woermannj from the files of Yfoermann^
dated Septeniber 4^ 1941^ about a con
ference with the Japanese Ambassador
Oshima* This memorandum was sent to
Ribbentrop^ Yfoermannj Erdmannsdorff
and Ritterj and also to the America
expert, Dieckhtff who initialed it#
Weizsaecker reports that he had in
formed Ambassador Oshima of the contents
of the recent Japanese-American talks,
regarding which Oshima had been kept in
the dark by his own government^
Oshima assured ^yeizsaecker however,
that only yesterday, he again telegraphed
to Tokyo his position on the subject of
Japanese-American relations# Tfeiz*^
saecker states*
"This position taken by
Oshima is in full accord
with the one desired by us, ^
so that actually, little was
left for me to add#"
yyeizsaecker cheered Up the somewhat
dishea!rtened Ambassador, by asserting
the following*
"♦••I cannot imagine at all
that among the Japanese
people, and correspondingly
in Japanese politics, the
militaristic instincts should
not finally gain the upper
hand*"
MPHASIS: Efforts of Weizsaecker (and
participation of other Foreign Office
defendants) to pronoto. Japanese 'entry
into war against United States#.
-19'
D|OCUni^nt..No< Description oiT Itocuflient
NGwliliT? MemDrandum, t^ewi'itten sigtiattire'ofBraun, Berlin|-^September 12, 1941> sub-^
, mltted to Weermann#
< In this memorandiam Braun refers to
his conversation vdth Mr» Kato^, a
Japanese newspaper representative# Mr*
Kato, who is regarded as a reliable
friend of Germany, felt alerted because
Roosevelt in his last apeech did not
tion Japan# Thns Kato alerted Braun that
in Tokyo ideas are ventilated on coming
to terms with the United States and
England#
MPHASISs Woermann connected with the
planis for pushing Japan into the war#
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Miiblt No» Document Nc» Dogcriptlon of Docimcnt Pago No,
NG-IU33 Copy of Top Sccrot TolGgrani from
Washington to Berlin signed Bootticher
and Thomsen, and initialed by Weiz-»
saockor > Iho telegram eoncems
Japaji^s aggressive intentions in the
Far East, dated 21 September 19Ul»
Distributed in ten copies, among
others, to Woermann^ Hitter, Erdmanns^
dorff♦
Boetticher reports that the Japanese
Ililitary Attache in Washington, Gonerdl
Isoda, expressed fears of British
and American military intervention in
case of a Japanese attack on Russia
or Japanese occupation of Ihailand
and the Dutch East Indies•
Bootticher relieved his fears by
picturing England and America as
weak and unable to attack#
vrhen General Isoda reiterated his
concern over possible American action
in the Pacific, Bootticher encouraged
him by suggesting Japan could cut
off the American supply lino to the
Dutch East Indies, and that the U«S«A,
was just trying to gain time#
*V/hon I pointed out to
him that it was necessary
to SCO also the weak side
of the opponent, and that
behind the brilliant
American facade, was grave
worry and uncertainty, he
replied that now he under-
stood why American policy
was centered on gaining
time # Now ho know enough# "
S'IPHASIS; Participation of Foreign
Office defendants in the planning of
war against U# S#
No, Document Mo» Description of- Document Page No,
NCj-2761 IfGnorandum from the files of T^eizsaeeker,
with his typevni'ittcn signature, dated 2o
ScptombGr regarding his interview
v/ith the Hungarian Tlinistor on Japan *s
future plans* Copies v/oro sent to Woor^
mann, Erdmannsdor ff and Pdttcr,
TTeizsaccker reports tliat he had
previously told the Hungarian llinistor
Stojay, that he boliovcd
"•••••Jepnn*s historic
hour had struck. One
could count on the fact
that the Japanese Govern-
ncnt would not lot this
opportunity pass by un
used, "
Today the Minister told 'yrlsfleacker
that the Japanese Goverruncnt follows
a policy of keeping Soviet forces in
the Far East tied up.
EI'.IPRt'LSIS: Connection of ^•'Vcizsaocker
and other Foreign Office dcfcndaits
vn.th plans for aggrossivo war.
. \
Exhibit rJo* Eocmcnt Ho* Doscription of Doomcnt
IIC--26S2 Affidaidt by Hansjiirgon Rciniclco,
fcrnicr operations export with the
German naval, high command^ regarding
German Foreign Office participation
in dra7/ing Japan into the war against
the United States, dated 30 Soptcmbcr
19U7.
Reiniokc states that by virtue of
his participation in discussions bo-
tivecn the High Command for Naval
VJ"arfaro, and the Foreign Office
liaison official, it is known to
hin that continuous attempts wore
made in 19Ul to drav: Japan into the
vrar on tlic side of the ibds, .Ambas
sador Pdttcr participated frequently
in those discussions.
Pago No,
Rcinicko has no doubt that "''•'"oizsaeckor
.;V
v;as si^u.larly active in promoting the
Japanese entry into the v/ar. He con
cludes this from ''fclzsacckor^ s close
relations "with Adiiiral Fricke, former
Chief of the High Command for Naval
Warfare, The latter was imbued with
talc idea of vanning Japan over to
enter the r/ar on Germany's side.
S.^!?H;t.SIS: Cooperation of Ritter and
other Foreign Office dcfcndiJits with
the German Navy in dravd.ng Japan into
war against the U. S,
^23-
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Exhibit "l\To« Document ITo, Description of Document page HOi
flO-Uh^O Memorandum from ^^eiasaedkerj initialed '
by him, to Ribbentrop, dated October 14,
. . 1941.
?jeizsaecker refers to a DriB press
dispatch from Tokyo of October 13, 1941,
and advises Ribbentrop that discussions
as provided by the Tri-partite pact and
suggested by Qtt, vrould n6t mean any
thing at the present time,
"..♦they probably v7ould
not contribute to the
activation of Japanese
policy,"
PMPHASIS: ^eizsaecker requests activation
of Japanese policy.
-24-
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Telegram from Ambassador Ott in'Tokyo
to the Foreign Office in'Berlin, taken
from Neizsaecker's files, dated October 11,
1941.
OttIs cable gives a detailed analysis
of the current strength and preparedness
of the Japanese Navy and of the possi
bility of its going into action in the
near future. He points out that the Navy
would be much better prepared to attack
than the'Army and that the morale and
training, particularly of the officers!
corps, is outstanding; The Navy is quite
prepared, reports Ott, to take over its
share of the action toward the South but
oxact plans (whether to attack Singapore
before or after occupying Thailand,
whether to occupy the'Philippines or to
avoid encircling them, or whether to
blockade Singapore and to simultaneously
attack Borneo and Sumatra) are tentative.
Although the complete naval plans are
supposed to be top secret, Ott has been
able to discover that an attack on Sing
apore is no longer considered possible,
and gives the reasons for this. An
action taking in the Philippines and pro
tecting the flank by simultaneously^
occupying Thailand and blockading Sing
apore appears the best guarantee that
the Japanese would be able to take posses
sion of the British and Dutch oil producing
areas in Borneo and Sumatra, This opera
tion seems fairly certain of success,
but it appears doubtful that these posi
tions could bo hold in the event of a
relatively long war with the Anglo-Saxons i
"For this reason it is a
matter of the utmost im
portance to knov; v;hat the
Axis powers intend doing
after the Russian campaign
and whether, after England's
coHapso, they will bo
willing and in a position
to provide armed assistance
to Japan against tho United
States,
EMPHASlSt Woizsaecker's continued coopera-
tion in the aggressive war plans of the
Japanese.
-25-
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No* Document No> Description of pocumont page No.
NG-UU^2 MGHiorandum with the handv/ritten signa- '
ture of Erdmannsdorff, dated October 18,
I9i;.l, sent to and initialed by WeiasaGckort
Erdmannsdorff points out that the re
cent cabinet change in Japan is an in^^rove—
ment according to Qshima's judgment.
Attached is a memorandum by Legation'
Secretary Braun, dated October 18, 1941,
signed by Braun and submitted through
Erdmannsdorff and initialed by Erdmannsdorff.
to tho state Secrotarj'- '/eizsaocker,
giving fin appraisal of tho nev; ca.binet,
Braun points out that tho now Japanese
cabinet is a notable improvement frdm
the viewpoint of the Axis, Hov/ever, Braun
docs not think that the cabinet, especially
Foreign Minister Tojo, vd.ll urge for a
quick entry of Japan into tho ivar»
Erdma.nnsdorff points out that the con
tents of Brxaun's memorandum should be
submitted to the Foreign l";duiistcr for
his report to tho Fuehrer,
B'IPHASIS: Srdmannsdorfffe connection with
the aggressive war plans.
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Urgent handwritten teletype of 0ct,10,
1941» from Y/eizsaecker to Ribbentrop
with copies to .ioermann aid Lrdmanns-
Qorffi
Weizsaecker gpints out that Oahxma
has told him that tho new Japanese cabinet
has to be regarded as an improvement,but
that Obhima is critic al about Togo who
is a man without a policy of his own.
V/eiszeecker adds that Lru.mannsdorff will
give more details about the members of
tue Cabinet after he has seen Oshiina#
V.eizsaeisker communicates to
Ribben-t;rop the "enjoyable mebsage" tist
a new Ja^xenese cabinet -more favorabl e
to aggression -has been appointed, x-rd-
mannsdorff's co.iiiection wixh aggressive
war plans.
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Exhibit Oocunont ?"o. Description of Document P-£e No,
NG-hhl8 ITemorsndum from Sr^annsdorff
vdth his hand^/ritten signature,
dated October IS, 19A-h, copies
to V.'cizsacckcr, who initia.led
it, and to hoermann^ about
Er^Larmsdorif''p discussion mth
bshima on the new Japmese cabinet,
Erdmennsdorff reports thft he has
sounded out Oshima, v^io had pointed
out that he, Ercfe^sdorff, with
his knowledge of Ja.pancso matters,
•VTould undoubtedly realize that the
pendulum there did not svdng quiclcly
from one extreme to the other, a
fact which v/ould explain wiiy an
extreme nationalist cabinet had not
been appointed at once.
It vfas Oshima's opinion, Zr^annsdorff
further reports, that in concluding
the Tripartite Pact, the Japanese
government must have been av/arc that
greater East Asia could be acquired
only by pushing "vdth the sv;ord" to
the South. This campaign had already
been planned, vdth only the question
left open as to when it should be
released, possibly to coincide wdth
Gorman operations against Great
Britain,
In concluding, Oshima had stressed
against the fact that the new cabinet
could not be regarded as an extreme
rightist one and that aside from
Togo there v/crc other members who
could not be considered to be firm
end energetic politicians.
^phas^s! Erdma.nnsdprff'_s connection
vdth tho aggressive war plans.
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Docuncnt Fo, Cescri£tl<5n of_Do_cwii^t P^-S.'^ __No.
P3~2C^9C C??.blc from the German Av.br.ssador
(U3A-I63) to Tokyo, Ott, of Fovcmbcr 3} 1941^
to the Foreign Office. Advcjice
copies sent to Reich Foreign Minister,
to the State Secretary (Fpizsacckor),
to the Under State Secretary for
Politic?!. Affairs Cjpprmann).
Ott reports about his conference
v-dth the Japanese Foreign Fdnister*
In this conference the Japanese
Foreign iiinistcr mentioned that the
American proposals v^ere unacceptable,
"Jap?,n did not fear a failure
of the negotiations ?nd hoped
thrt in such a case Germany
and It?!y would be on the side
of Japan in accordance with the
Throe Power pact,"
Ott, so reads his ca.ble, responded that
"...there could bo no doubt
about Gcrm?.ny's future posi
tion. The Japanese Foreign
J'iinivster ansvrercd that he
concluded from my (Ott's)
words that Germany in such
a case v/ould regard her-
relationship with Japan as
a common f-''te, I responded
that in my opinion Germany
would surely be rca.dy to make
a rcciproca! agreement on
this. To this the Foreign
rinistcr said that it v/,?.s
possible that he would soon
come ba.ck to this point..."
asis: Further participation of
jcizsaccker and 7oormam in urging
for Japanese war against U.S.
-29-
libchiblt Nc. PccTjnon^^* Vcscviptipn of Do6t^;^ Pagcjo.
tybcvTr-i 4-+ ^
.^r-wj^ nct^randm eo,vcyinpinstructions fi-c-a Ribbontro^
sugg^s'ts that a message be sent
to tobr.ssr.dor Ott, eonpUod of
oxccrpts from cables fron T.'ash-
infton, indicatlnc that the
present SItuaUcn i, ospecially
favore.bli. to Japan to realize
her politL»al miuticns in the
ynitcd States
fore ^vith Japan's'Su-n in tSc'''"
TtSs\c?\V'of thi fact in order th-t the
latter can point it out to leadinr
Japanese personalities ^
EHFHASIS: Connection of V.'oiz9ac«kcr.
7fc_ciawj«^ .and Mrsssdorfflri:^
fm-thorinc of too anhrossTon,
E.idiibit No» Docxmont No, Doscripti-yn of Docunont
NG-h371 A Copy cf cr.blo frcn VrpizsaGCker over his
t^npcvn^ittcn slp:naturo to Anbassador Ott,
tlirou^h the hands of "'^ ocriaann (initialod
b7/ hio) and 5rdnannsdorff« copies to
Dicckhoff and others"^ ibis cable
su";inarizGS rcpo:ifts fron the Gcrnan
JtLlitar^/ Attache in "'^^ashington, dated
NovcnbGr 191:1 •
bbissacckor advises /iP.bassador Ott
to utilize the follovdng points in
discussions vd-tji high Japanese
personalities;
Anorj.can policy is designed to keep
Japan cut of the v/ar. In the event
of Japanese action in East Asia,
Anoricans izoifLd be confronted v/ith
the dilcnna of cither suffering a
blow to their dignit;/ or going to
war. In the latter case, /inorica,
then involved in a tv.'o-front vrar,
vrould have to curtail radically her
aid to Britain. At present, the
United States arc attempting to
intraidatc Japan, hoping tc prevent
her fron entering the v/ar.
"American tactics arc
designed, as they have
been in the past two
years, tc deceive their
opponents .and to hide
their cvm weakness, "
Cable concludes vrith the request that
tlec above iniomation be utilized in
conjunction vdth Cable No. 20li7.
NG-.1;371 B Copy cf cable No. 20li7j dated 6 November
19Ul and dispatched on 9 Novcnber 19l;l,
over Ribbentrop's signature, taken fron
^.loemann^s files. Copies sent tc
bbizsacckor and Erdnannsdorff» anong
otJicrs.
the foll'-vfing infornation is to be
utilized in talks with high Japanese
offici.als and is tc bo passed on tc
Stahncr when he irrivcsj iinorican
propaganda is aimed at frightening
Japan, but actuall;^, the United Stotcs
arc attcnpting to mask the real weak
ness cf thoir position,
Ihtolligenco received by Iho Goman
Embassy in ''''ashinrton, indicates that
the /J-Torlcan arnoncnt industry is un
able tc develop production to such a
peak as to enable the coimtry to
v/agc a tiTc-front war and continue
suppljdng England and Russia.
Hic United States care making every
effort tc avoid war In the Pacific.
-31-
Pago No,
ai-;
' • I-.' y'
JfcX'
*1%
yo. DocH2onlJ°- Dsscr.ipt.ion of Occmcnt
For those roo.sons, ca^ot
ifford to niss her opportuni y»
Ifcvor in histoi7i, wr-.s a State sofavored by fat^ as is Jap.an at tiii
hour* •
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**" >JC)._ pocuTiieiv^ J-0._ Description of Document
Memorandum signed by Braun of
November 7, 19W., submitted to
•li®i^saecker and initialed by
him, sent through Srdmcumsdorf
and yoermann__and initialed by
both.
Pa£e No_,
Braun reports that Ushiba, the
seeretary of the Japanese ijnbassy,
had informed him that Ambassador
Oshims. had conferred v/ith Togo •
by telephone on the previous day
and that Oshima had gotten the
impression that Japan intended
to adopt a firmer attitude.
Further, Ushiba had informed
Braun of the conten'te of a cabled
report from Nomura in '"ashington
commenting on the attitude in the
United States tov/ard the inter
national situation. It was Nomura's
guess that the United States v/as .
not yet ready for v;,?.r and for that
reason v/as limiting hor contribu
tion to aid to England and Russia,
only to step in at the last moment
and grab- the glory of the victory*
The U, S. attitude tovTard Japan
had stiffened and the economic
blockade V7as receiving popular
support but the danger of war in
the Pacific "was not seriously
considered, l^iJltary circles,
on the other hand, v/ere reported
to be not so optimistic and to
realize the v/ar in the Pacific
V7ould place the U.S. in a critical
position.
"Herr Ushiba then stressed
that this report from
kashington shov/ed ^or Uie
first time a reversal in
appraisal of the Ariiericaji
situation by Ambassador
Nomura. Arabassa;dor Nomura
had up to nov; always held
an American entry into the
vrar to be imminent. The
Embassy here assumes that
the relatively cautious
reaction to the destroyer
sinkings in "the United States
has brought about Nomura's
changed appraisal,
Shows connection of
v^eizsaecker, Erdmanndorff and
wbermann v/ith the German plans.
-^32-
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ExMbit No,_ Dpciocnt No. Description of JDocumont
m-hla9c^
ppge_No,
NG-Uiil9b
Kcmoranduin "with typov/rittcn
signature of E^rdmannsdorff to
IVoizsaeckor, dated Novcinbcr
19U1, 't^=iccn from licizsacckcr'_s
filesj with typewritten signature
of Srdmannsdorff*
Sr^annsdorffmemorandum states
that, according to instructions
from Rintclen, convoyed to him by
2jDermann_j_ ho has been assigned to
take over Stahmer's former function
of sounding out Ambassador Oshima.
hborm^n had suggested thrt, in
order to legitimize Er^annsdorff ^s_
position, it v/ould be vrcll for
}-'eizs_a_cckcr to inform the Abassador
accordingly.
Memorandum signed by Jbcmann_to
%c^z^aockcr and initialed by
_^cizs_acckcr. CopT?- to Er^annsdorff.
hoermannj^s momorandum conveying
Rintclcn's instructions njid advice
in the matter of Er^annsdorff'
assignment from Ribbentrop to sound
out Oshima on the Kurusu matter,
Rintolen had stated that it woiiLd
be a good idea for Sr^annsdorff
to contact Oshima on his ovm v^hen-
cver such matters came up. In
other words, concludes l{ocrmann_i,
he should take up Stahmcr's former
role.
Bnphasisj^ ^di3i^nsdorff'_s participa
tion together with Jcizs^a.eckcr and
•_bcrma^_in the program of provoking
Japan into entry into war against U, S,
-33-
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Exhibit' NOt Document Tjo. poxcrlption of pocumBnt page
NG-UU23 Hcmorandum. with typev/ritton signature'
of Erdmannsdorff,'to Foreign Minister,
dated Novoinbcr 17, 1941, vrith copy to
Wcizsaeckor, and initialed by Weiz-
saecker; copy to 'Toerniann,
Erdmannsdorff reports that, according
to instructions, he discussed v/ith.-tHe
Japanese anhassador the possibility of
a Japanese offensive either tov/ard the
north or the south. Qshima had commented
that he did not have any information as
to the intentions of his government and
that ho could only state his personal
opinion. It was his guess that ^military
operations against Soviet Russia could
take place only on a small scale end
that any large-scale attack, on Vladi
vostok, for example, would have to be
postponed until spring. Underlined by
Weizsaecker.
On the other hand, continued Qshima,
the economic losses suffered in the war <
with China and the economic boycott of
the Anglo-Saxon powers had made some
sort of offensive toward the South im
perative because of the urgent demand
for crude oil. In reply to Erdmannsdorff's
inquiry as to what would, constitute such
an offensive, Qshima had answered that
the most important objective vfould bo
the island of Borneo, It was Qshimats
opinion that the simplest alternative
would bo to attack Borneo directly but
that the most effective method would bo
to attack Singapore, An attack on Borneo
would, of course, have to take into con
sideration the proximity of the Philippines,
hov7cvor it might be possible to give
assurances that American possessions
would not bo end.-'ngerod, while, of course,
being prepared to take action against
.the Philippines, should the U.S. atti
tude be such that it would be necessary.
In reply to a further inquiry from
Erdmn.nnsdorff, Qshima had commented
that "the Anglo-Saxon powers might just
barely condone a Japanese march into
Thailand," which would have to be made
after a preliminary arra.ngemont with
that government, and which vrould have the
effect of creating a good springboard
for oxi attach on Singapore, Should
American naval units attenpt any inter
ference this would only'be to Japan's
advantage since they would be operating •
far from their bases. In Qshima's •pinion
any decision as to Japan's future policy
would await the result of the Kufusu
special mission.
EMPHASIS; Erdmannsdorff's full coopera-
tion in pushing Japan into the war,
-34-
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Exhibit No, Document No, Description of Docunient P.S. No,t
NG - 4395 Telegrrjft from the Germrin Ambassador
in Rome, Meckensen, to the'German
Foreign Midister'in Berlin, dated
December 3, 1941,
Mackonsen reports about a confer
ence with the Italian Foreign Minister
Ciano, Cia.no has reported to him
about a conference between the Duce
n 4-Uq T'»T^n»^oc/^ ArnKTi ep.-iTn th"
ciUUUO ci ouiiJ. d uo f.
and the Japanese mbassa.dor. In this
conference the Japc?nese Ambassador had
instructed the Duce regarding Japanese-
American relations. On this occasion
the Japanese informed the Duce
"e»«that the outbreak of a
.conflict between Japan and
the United States, and thereby
also with Great Britain, ^
ouglit now to be regarded as
possible and forthcoming in
the' immediate future,"
Thoreforo, the Japanese government
had requested that the Italian declara
tion of v^ar should follow immediately,
according to the terms of the Tripartite
pact. To this the Duce had ansvrcrod
that
Italy would do evoryV
thing in order to further
militarily the success of
the battle for which Japan
pr<^arcs herself novr against
the United States and the
British Empire,,,"
©ffHASIS: Italy and Germany are given _
advance notification about Japan's decision,
-35-
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Exhibit No* Docunont No* Doscriptlon of Dccunont
NG-I.367 Cable fron /inbassador Ott, Tokyo to
Forc-isn Office Bcrlinj dated $ Eecenber
19hl, taken frora •Vfoernann's files,
initialed b\ Copies sent to Bohle,
Kcpplor, Ritter, Erdaannsdor ff.
Ott reports that the Japanese Foreign
Ilinisiiy is ccnsidering ways of start
ing an -"inevitable conflict" "viith the
United States. A high official of
the Japanese Foreign ?iinistry stated
that Japan believed iirticle 3
Tripartite Pract vfas applicable in
the event of any conflict between
one of the signatory powers and the
United States, except in case of an
Americannnprovoked attack on the
continent.
Italy has already been advised last
TTeek that she should consi^ier which
.pc'wer should take over the protection,
of her interests.
Ott continues that the Japanese
Foreign Hinistry intends to nako the
declaration of war coincide with the
opening of hostilitios. Ho, in turn.
advised them to avoid a direct attack
in order to place the responsibility
for the war on the United States in
accordance with instructions received.
Ott requests further instructions in
view of the mounting tension.
ElIPHi'iSIS: Shews Germany's advance
knowledge of the Japanese atback.
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E^ibit Ho, Docunont Nc> PcT-criptxpn Pago No,
NG-.270^ Note fror.i Dorenberg'^s office subnitted to
and initialed by Voizsacckors, dated
6 Deconber l^Ul, regarding the crisis
in the Far Fast,
VrGizsa-ockor is inxcmod that the Chief
of Protocol, Minister von Doornberg,
has suddonlsr loft Berlin to inform ' ,
the Hungarian Chief of State, Horthy,
that Ribbentrop is unable to accept
his invitation to go hunting
'because of iiic crisis
in the Fpt East,"
E^'PHi^SIS: Pro-Pearl Harbor knowledge
of Foreign Office of the coming Japanese
acix'^ -'n,. ^
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Exhibit Document No< Description of Document
m
NG-if396 Telegram from Ambassador Ott in'Tol^yo
to the Foreign Office in Berlin,
dated Docomber 8, 1941, distributed
in eighteen copies, aiaong others, to
Ribbentrop, '•feizsaocker (initialed by'
Weizsaeckor and taken from his files),
Woerroannj Erdmamsdorff*
Ott stresses the point that the
Japanese action was a surprise action.
The necessity of the surprise had al
ways been emphasized strenuously by
him and the German military attache.
QMiASiS: The surprise nature of the•GiLl'i-rlliiOXo: csLu xxo\-; —-
details of the Japanese action T/as in
line with Japanese policy.
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Exhibt Fo. DocLv.cr.t Fo, Description o_f__pocuident Page _No_
m^hh2h Telerram from German Aj'obassador
Ott, Tok^/Oj to Foreign I.'inister
Ox December 9, 1941^ taken from
'.bermann's files and. initialed
by him. Copies sent to lieppler»
Hitter, Erdmansdorf and others.
Qtt reports about his conference
•with the Japanese Foreign k'inister.
In this conference the Japanese
Foreign Minister informed him
officially about the decision of
the Japanese government to enter
the v/ar against the U. S. and
Britain,
"The Japanese govern
ment expects that nov;
Germany too should declare
right av/ay war against the
United States, ambassador
Oshima had received similar
instruction. The Foreign
Minister also declared that
Oshima had received the
necessary instruction con
cerning the agreement to
conclude only by joint
action peace or armistice
"The Foreign Minister
declared .... thct it
Y/as hoped that through
the attack against Ha^./aii
the Americans vfould pre
vent it from action in
the Vbstern Pacific Ocean."
Emphasis! Japanese request to honor
the German promises given through
Foreign Office officials.
-39^
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Exhibit No. Documont No, Description of Docuniont page No,
PS - 2932
(USA-165)
Mcmorandujii on the reception of the
Japanese /unbassador, General OShima,
by Hitler on December Ik, 19l!-l, in the
presence of Ribbentrop, Handwritten
signature of Ambassa-dor Hev/el, liaison
man betvfoen Ribbontrop r,nd Hitler,
The Fuehrer presented Qshima with
the Grand Cross of the Order of the Gor
man Eagle in gold. This expression of
apprecication was prepared by Meissner
as chief of -the President chancellery.
In cordial words Hitler paid tribute to
Qshima for'
»',.,his services ih the
bringing about of the Gor
man—Japanese cooperation
which has nov/ boon croimcd
in a' close brotherhood in
arms,••"
"The Fuehrer continues;
'You gave the right declara
tion of war;'this method is
the real one,.,"
'iTho Japanese Government
really had not done dn^t-hing
frivolousj he (the Fnehrcr)
must say that the Japanese
Government had shown the
patience of angels towards
that rov/dy, Roosevelt. • .For
Germany the entrance of Japan
into the war meant a groa,t
easing of the situation. He
must admit openly that ho
(the Fnehror) had felt con-
corncd about the prospects of
success in the U-boat V7a,r,.,"
"HOj the Fuehrer, v/as, con
vinced that Roosevelt must be
boaton. It had boon the great
accomplishment of the Japanese
that they have destroyed right
in the beginning thc'mybh of
American superiority,,.How any
way were troops to offer re
sistance to the end v/hcn their
god was the doll.ir?"
EL5PHA5IS: Qshima receives his reward
for his successful, cooperation with the
Gcrraa-n Foreign Office dofohdants in
pushing. Japan into the war.
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TRANSLATION OF DOGUiiENT No.NG-45*Jd^ i
OFFICE OF CHIEF .OF OOUNSEL FOR 7AR CRb-j-DS
V
A F. F^ I D A V I T
I, Dr. Friedrlch GAUS, in the year 1941 Hinist^rial
Director and Chief •f the Legal Division of the C-ernan Foreign
Office, vrith the title of an Under State Secretary, here^^ith
under oath, after having beon instructed that I Tnahe nyself
liable to punishment through a false statement, declare the
follo^'dng of ay own free will and '-'dthout duress or threat j
1) Throush my persona.1 observations, thr-iugh the knnwle^ge
of secret documents of the Foreign Office, especially ff memoranda
•n deolonatic conferences of Hitler and Ribbentrrp, and also
through personal stcitements of the Minister, the final objectivesnf the foreign policy of the Third Rr>ich as'they '^cre Pursued
at the high point of its aggro^ssive actions in the ye^r 1^41,
became knovm .to me as follows;
p"! The German p'^litical leadership sa'-^ in the Je.panes attack
r,n Pppirl H&rbor on 7 December 1941 the first step to'-^ard the?eal!Stion nf the idea of founding a Great G^^^nanic Empire. For
thiq Enoire intended not only to rule Europe, but to be thedecisive fc-ct^r in the steering of wnrld events in their entirety.
Z) Tho Japanese entry into the had a long prior history
in the files of the Foreign Office, that is comprised of many
dlpl'^matic actions.
A) Th- triaaular coalition Berlin-Rome-Tokyo, Rlbbentrop •
thP TrlSIrlite Pact ef Kuturnn 1940. 'f/ith the Japanese attack In
P r ILt the German foreign policy detrrnlned no~ trthe For i reaching objective of destri?>ying forever the
lr?d emplrl L the^ame time It '-^as Int'^ -nded that th^
Hni't-d States should* thereby receive a pcsltlen of second.rank,
^ thrherltege of the British -orld empire and her
n s Tsohere of po4r and influence limited to the northern4L!effS^?i.'"a'rifikon%r?lflpJererolrn^^
tL^fiLtern Hemisphere '
PerslIfGuirand'through Indian Ocean easVjards of Africa.^^discuesion of the ^dcnarcahon line in
i?.rinL rjy ss'Sm.
llf/ioilT't I'talSS Io tjo proper .loo t»ro».h th. -
ratio cf power bet'*reen Germany a.nd Italy.
.S-I This dividing up of the world was no mere
the plin ^f actlir?hat^erman diplomacy intended to transfer imreLimimLdiately thr^sugh the "final victory."
(signed) Friedrlch GAUS
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TRANSLATION OP DOOUiviENT No.NG~4F5'5~'
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR 7VaR CRIKSS
i 6) At first Cerinan foreign policy had tried after 1939,
' during the brief period of G-erra-any's friendship ^^'ith the
^ Soviet Union, to include R,ussia in the realization of this
* plan of world-wide ecope. On the occasion of the visit of the
Russian Foreign kinister riolotov in Berlin in Hovenbcr 1940,
the objective ''-as pursued v^ith all energy on the part of the
Crrmans of diverting Russia from the acute European problems,
0-^ directing its policy to -,a southward advance against the
British Empire and thus having it participate, as it was
vtrhPllv said, "in the liquidation of the reanins of the] R-nitish Enpire," This plan became through the decision for the
Attach aaainst the Soviet Union obsolete. It must als^ be
considered that the plan of- landing in England had had to be
flinndoned. Lihewlae the attempt .to win Spain to mahe an
attach an Cibraltar an(i cut.England off frm the mediterranean
had failed,
7) But the Third R„ioh saw itself in the Sunmer nf 1P41
•t- fh-^ Deak of its power. No"' the pain oi drawing Japan into
war oftle side of the Axis powers oape fully Into the • -fokgrouSd of the policy that RlDbentrop "'as pursuing "-Ith
his diplonctlo nachinery. The &.rman 9 the7,1th olaved -"Ut the last political truo.p card, to givedlth blow to the British Er-.pire through the Japanese attack
agaln.et Singapore and India.
! S) In doing this the foreign P"ll°yiyn^'Tho^Lr"lth
'• 4-hVtrMit foncern included in i'ts ocilculations the "far itn
^hfSn^tTstitk-, because the Am.rlcn c^apcitles for ^ o
•ivn-ncrtina Britc,vln appraised as an unimpcrtctnt issufor tho 'm-r, and it w.s planned to eliminate then entirelythrough the anticipated rapid victory ovfr the British E, pir
The Reich Foreign kinister Ribbtntrop in 1941 regarded
the final goal as so Innlnently approaching that '£4krfeh1h:ioiL-nI-trSe thf '
rinisLr\rno?froon'lor''6rek'wkon°W
in consequence be pushed aside by an unn^figure. Ribbentr.p expressed .he
in the future have his policy in Wpsningtnn
represented by military men*
lO) This astounding personal concern entryRibbentkp fron applying -lL^if,^rUn°tre'ba?grin tSleby
of Japan into the war ana accepting in -hi v'cheap price.
warllth the United States as a Go^an aotir
Thleby world-wide import w^^e to be fto2;r?S P"i"r»'. tm. ti.,
der^lbedrbkh in private o^versatlons^and^alco^^n
irm-t'lSr'tanriv'ent ofth.l w.r, an event that opened
up w.rld-wide perspeotives.
- 2 -
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OFFICE OF CHI^F'OF COUNSEL FOR '.YaH G?]JiE3.
I have carefully drawn' up an affidavit ©funprlsing two pagee
in the Gerr?,an language, and,have reviewed this English
translation thereof, and personally signed it. I herewith
declare under oath that I have made this statement to the best
of my kmjwlei-'.ge and conscience corresppaiding to the full truth,
Nuernberg, January 25,- 194^, " ,(signed) Dr.Friedrich GAU^
SwQrn to and 'signee before- me this 25th day of January
1948 at Nuernberg, by Friec'rich GAtJS, kno'^ to me to be the
person making the above affidavif,
(signed) r KAi.IPNER
Deputy Chief of
Counsel
CT.S^iv^X 001619
Witnesses j
Jane Lester, U.S, Civ. AGO X 046159 (signed) Jane Lest--^r
Hargot Lipton, U.S.--CiVr AGO A 165633 (signed) hrrgot Lip O;
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OFFlOy. OF OKIFF OF COUFSFL' TOE CHIM31
Stntc Socrotr.ry Uo, 736 Snrlin, 2S Sept. 19^0
To—nivht I rocciivov. the Eussian an^'. inforr.ind
hin, accordinrC to instructions, that and how Mr, HOIOTOV .had hoon
kept xnfornie.d prior to cnclusirn of the 3 Power Pact, At tho sarne tluc
I cinphOvsized to tho Anhassa-'or th.o.t tho Eoich Foroi.m Kinistor would
have liko^ to seo the Antassador in pors'^n as goon ag ho had ono aoncnt
to hinsclf, tho.t, howovor, ahovc coa-nmicati'-'n had •b.:on or.trustod to do
in viow of tho fact that Hcrr v^n EliEBZi^TEDP vr?.s unfortunatoly o'bllo'ed
to stay in "bed,
Purlnc thvo convorgati'-a I took my load fron tho instructions
hy t,.;lGsran dated 25th inat, dii ' tched to Moac^w, and instciad of
nail inp An erica as the poiiror whon the troo.ty v/as .ainin^r at, used the
norc general tcri, that it was a warninfT for tho denocro.tic powers^
After havini: thug infomcd the Anhassador, I invited his
atto'ntien to the 6th para,.-raph from tho end in yesterday's st.atc-nont of
the Erich Poreian Minister in which anona: other things, n,,-ntion is nado
of relations yot to "be established" between the pact si- '^-natorios and
Sovl(,t Eussia.," I interpr.-itod that sentence to nc-an tho consoH-'ation
an., intensification of relations betwron the siroio-tory powers, particularr
ly also Japan, on tho one hand and the Soviet Union on the other, with
a view to their conrion political aims. I a^":ded that Mr, SCH}£AH23^
was afti..r all familiar witdi tho fact that we h.avc alv/o,ys b.:H":n working
in that -'irection as f-ar o.s Japan iias concerned.
The Arabassndor accepted my information with word ^f thanks,
askod no questions l^hatBOoV5r and .:^roaaod tho wish for the apoody ro-
oovory of the Reich fforoi-T. Minister,
SifTncdt W3I2SaE0:-:iR
Office of the Eoich Porci,:rn Minister
Under State Secretary, Political division
Deputy Chief Political Division
Un%r State Secretary, X.^.-nl Division
Press Bivislon,
••X
mNSL-ATIOl^ Oi^ DOOU'lStTO? Ho ."l?Cw-307U
coHTniu:^)
C"Errb-ICAT~ OP 'TPAHStATIGH
9 Dncpa'brr 19^7
I, L, STISIHHR, Ho. 20 15O, }inrnby certify that I Pa a i^.uly
appointed translator for the G- moa and rarlish. lan'-aa-os and th-at tho
above is a true and correct tra-nslation of the docniujit Ho. HG-—3C7^*-
mth Lo STIJIHDR
Ho. 20 150
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OFFIQE 0? CHIiiF OF GOUNSIlL FOR "aR- GRIMES
Telegpaiii, i-"
(Secret Gode Froceduye)
Wa-shington Februar/ 26.1941
received " " ' "
2251 hre.
1105 hrs.
Very urgent!
Nr. 500 of February 25^
For O.K.77. Abroad,
O.K.H, Attach^ section,
R.L.iu.Attachi, group.
Military reports of February 25,
I)
10 copies made
Of those went:
No.l to Pol.I
Secret (woriting
Copy)
No.2 to Foreign
vdnister
No,3 to State
Secretary
No.4 to Office
Foreign
luinister
N^.5 to Ambassa
dor Ritter
'No.6 to Chief ,
Dept.Pol.
No.V to Chief
Dept,Eco,
No.8 to Chief
Dept.Press
No,9 to Per
sonnel
No.10 to Dir.
Pol.
This is No.3.
If the conclusion I reached here is correct, 'ther
is no instant in the history of Wars where
canouflaging - '^orKs as excellent, and affects the
enemy's nerves as much as at present. In reality
one only hnows . certain fig-ures about 3r^t^sh
shipping losses, which, specially after the
Fuehrer's speech, affect the nerves of the Engllf-
leatiers and Ar^erlcan wire pullers. Nothing Is
known about the futuhe measures of Japan, but one
-is Inj^ressed by Japan's denand to rule the entire
Oceania anu the papers are publishing maps about,
it's enormous extention. The question comes up
with respect to the British Isles if the Fuehrer
is going to limit himself to a War of blockade,
or is going to invade. One looks tc-^ards Spain,
towards Greece, to the Persian Golf, and the
Suez Canal, ami behind big words scarcely can
'hide the fear of coming events about which, after
- 1 -
tfi'• «
.. \ »
•M.
•A.rrj-
i;^5l ,ti
w>a.-
'K
OFFICE OF-CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR GRIi'ES
all, one oan't predict anything.
In the press and over the Radio England brings reports
about discussions between Churchill and the Japanese and
Turkish Ariibassadors, • VilOegedly about military problems, about
the discussion between Eden and Dill in Cairo, their trip to
Adana, (page 2 of original)
the declaration of the Turks to adhere to their obligations,
and about indistinct Japanese ship movements.
One scrutinizes the Fuehrer's speech for indications of
Coming operations of the Gprman Wphrnacht. The Ej^glish are
brineing the report that they are fortifying with planes
every front in the Far jiast, in the jj/iit'dle East, In the
Mediteranean and in England, because new pilots from the Empirp
training plan, and planes, delivered by America, are available
in abundance. The Is all bluff, if England does not split her
forces. The truth about the pilots and the American planes is
shown in my reports.-
Then came Roosevelt's new demand for over 3 billion.-
dollaj^ in particular for aviation equipment. As if--under
present conditions that could be of any use, and have results
in 1941.
II) On the other hand some truth is leaking out. That up to
now Swansea has been the city most effected by the War in
Enfland. It was darnaged muoli core than Coventry, because It ws
attacked three nights in succession. A fact, which strongly
goes on British nerves. Furthermore one is astonished that,
incite of good weather, there was little German activity in- t:
air during the night, of the 24th to the S5th_and conclusions
are dra™, concerning the development of the ill boding future
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The report from London that, for the time "bftlng, the
Greek: have refused a British offer to land troops on Salonika
territory imtll Greece really has been attacked by German
trocps, is looked upon as a diplonatlo ruse of the English,
One asks England- is at all in a position to take up the
fight_agalnst Germany in Greeo^ and the Balkans, Slowly ^ne
begins to realize that Wars arje not alike, and 'ttiat the populc
comparison with the World Wards not corrept.
; /t/ Boettlcher*
/%/ Thomsen,
Note: By teletype to O.K.W,
and RU/i secret transmitter -
forwarded to Tel,Kts,26,2.41,
(page 3 of original) BBT 5275 B
yesterday I received the visit- of Mr,_0,F.dHRENKIEL,
Director of the Hamburg American Line and of the North German
Lloyd In New york, who has Just arrived fr%m the United Statec
-He reported about the -dispopltlon" and situation in America,
especially about gradually growing armament efforts and the
help for England, in particular oonoerning shipping. I was
interested in a remark made by Kir.aBiRENKIEL, wh#m I have
known for years to be a shrev/d observer, that our quiet and
recerved dlpJibnatlc and publlcistlc attitude toward the
Unltee States, during the first 15 months of the War, was
the deciding factoi that the American aid to England was
only started so late. If right from the beginning we had
squabbled with the U.States diplomatically and Journallstloal'j
it would have b«en mu«h easier for the prsaidant to arous®
public Opinion against Germany and thus get quicker and
stronger help for England. kr.AHRENKIEL quite understands
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, that now, after Roosevelt^s election and the passing of the
lend lease bill in Congress we use stronger v^rds in our
press against the United States,
(page 4 of original)
He thought this could not produce any more damage on the
other sidej but that, on the contrary, this tactic was now
jUstifiedi .
Submitted herewith
on page 1
throu^ the Secretary ol State to t]
Reich Foreign Minister,
(dispatched 22,11-41)
Berlin, February 22,1941.
/t/ signature: DieoJthoff
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Hr.Ahrenkiel comes on 26-11. to Bfrlln
Date,
THd^LATION
I, 'yjip VON ECKiifTT, 100 ^ l6' 6%, hereby certify that I am
a aaly appointe'-" trcr^slater fcir the German an'^ English
languages an' that the above is a true ah'-'~correct translation
of ''ocument No, NG-
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Telcgr^-.m -(Secret Code) St.-mp -
Clrssifled
...r.terlFl
Fuscni, February 27ti-, 1^'41
A.rrivsl " ' " " 2o,oO -
Reicn Foreign wiinister 49/R to ti^e Foreign Office Berlin
-i. Diplogeriia Tokio
/
2. For tne Cypher office
ho. 119 of 27.2. '
..v,r
Secret note for the official in cnr,rge (Denoe:'denleiter)
(±a.D.B. 06 II)
For the Ambassador personally.
please use every effort witn all means at your disposal to
induce Ja.,yan to occupy Singapore as soon s possible by sur
prise. You will gatner all furtaer details from tne informrtion
telegram wnicn is leaving today st tne Sr.me time as t.-is.
hote_
To Tokio on 27.2.1941
Passed on at 26.50 hours
undd'r ho. 252
t
< Cii. B.
Hibbentro
Under Secretary of State for
politicrl Affairs
imb-ssador Bitter
Director (Dg) Political Dept.
Working Copy wltn Under' Secretary
of State (Legri Div.)
pencil note - secretar of Stite^^"
Ja-v..-'^
} An indie; tion to arc*..ivx6t to file in tne files of t^^e
Secret^-ry of State under "Japan" - Analyst)
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£ 2 E 2: (Stamp) _Classified Materiel
Telegrc. mm
(Open)
Special trairi, 28tn February, 1941
Arrival: -Zhth " "
1.45 hours
OQOO "
Nr, 120 of_28.2._ Reicn Foreign Minister -51/R
In'^Gyyher (Secret Coae)
*) M£rginal_^note
Passed on to
Tohio under i>io.
2u0. Tel.Ktr.
28.2. e'.50 9.45
10,20
Under ^ocrctary
of Stato (?ol)\
Under Secretary
of 3t£,te (Legal
Dlv.)
Ambassador Ritter
Director of tne
Z^conomic Dept.
Director of tne
press De^t.
tirigent (Dg)
political Devt.
Work-inti Copy
vJitn Under Sec.
of State (pol)
Fusonl, 27 February, 1941
Diplogerma Tokio *)
Secret note for official in Ci±arge (Be-
noerdenleiter)
For personal information only.
Tne Japanese Ambassador Osnima called on me
in Fusonl on February 2drd. Tne conversation was
conducted, as always, in en atmospnere of especial
friendliness and confidence. Tne following ere
tae details of tne .ourse it took:
By way of introduction I gave a survey of t
general political situation:
vfhen war with England beopme inevitable,
FuexTrer decicecl to settle matters with Russia, so
as to avoid a war on two fronts- Sucu a settlement
was in tx.e long run in tne interest also of Japar
wno was Interested in as speedy as possible a vic
tory for (rermany. Ine .onolusion of the German-
Japanese treaty of alliance must he followed by
its furt-er development. Tnere were no further
militfry problems for dermanx bn tne Continent.
Germany would not tolerate England's gaining ?•
footnold a-in at any point on t.e Continent: in.
tne Mediterranean, Greece, or els»;:Vi/j:i<.rc, Engl
no^es for blockade, nunger, and unrest v^ere futi | ;
England must be forced to see tnat s^e -rd no n.h
pas of victory and must sue for ijecrCc. Germany ^
(na-nd'Airitten note) St.s
III i. iii.riaB
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keeping a close eye on developments in Frajice^ was not
interested in the occupation of tne wnoie country, if only
so as to prevent Fren^.. /Ifrica falling into tx^e lap of de
G-aulle. The powt^n of'France was broken for all time. The
occup8,tion of the occu2ie.d__countries_was purely of a police
nature. They were peaceful and not sixort of food. C5-ermeny
herself had sufficient food, and occasional shortages in
raw materials, were, practically speaking, of no signifi
cance.
136587
page Z of original)
In tae spring 240 divisions would be read;, and of tuerc
lb6 were first—cla.ss a.ttack divisions. Rounianiv^ hung^p^^^,,—
and Slov£l:ia_nad alrea.dy joined txae Tri-partite pact.
Bulgarials^entry into it was not iiuminent. Tne Turkisxx-
Bulgarian declaration indicated tnat Turkey was cleaTly
disassociating herself witix warlike developments in tne
Balkans and witn Sngiand. Neither Turkey nor Russia would
t?.ke any action in tne event of German intervention in Gree
Jugoslavian statesmen nad recently intimated tneir desire
for peaco by a visit to Germany. Jugoslavia would nave to
come over into our cajnp sooner or Iter. Tnus the Balkans
% mould be under our control. Tne Brltlsn mould -.ave to leave
areece. Italx bad suffered setbacks. Sne nad attacked areeCv
without our knowledge while areece was milltsrily ill-pre
pared. Txie Italian front in areece, however, mas now stabi
eeneral Wavell's ad^Bnoe in iMortn ^fraca was due to tne 1%.
lian's f<=ar of tanks, for t^ey w.re not sufficiently traine-
in fignting tanx^s. We nad now sent a unit to Lxb/a, in ord.
If .t aii possible, to bring about a turn in tx.e Duoe, and
we ware nelpln. tnem in tne procurement of raw materiais.:
We were on good and trusted terms with Ipain- So.ner or
-.2-
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ia.t^r sxie vjouid join U-s o .-6 iy, "but w & stlXl aesit' tine," ?t
on =,ocou it of difficulties ^viti- ner fo^i/d owpijiy. Rel?.-
tions 'Hit.. Rus6i;._ /crc:; good, .moreover, UrVlng re,^-rd to our
luiiit ^ry s cron-^C-i s-iO •'/jould 6,'voi-d t-kin.i -ny e.cgIoiI r-^.-.insc Ui>l
•"c^.ixLi w-5 coAd-'bio-ded c-ud clever poiixioi n. (i-eriiFny wa.o
studying affairs in txie le.sc witi. compl-'ce criffl, A. G-ermen-Rus--i£n
coniiict, Wiiic.i vve cad not want, would mean a. coiossrl derma,n
victor.y and tue enc. of ti.e "aoviet rr^ime.
In tna war 9 '^-^ "bom*bs nad, in spite of tne
"brd woat..er, wrougxit vy L.arage, wnicn was causing severe set-
b-CiS-S to BrixiSi. w.r producxioj, exc.. e were a.o.;ing pro yres-ivei
to destroy by tne biubings f "r more txan A.merxca could re.i^ce.
From ti-.e end of ..p.rcx. tne use of U—"boats •^oulc be .^reptlj' in-
c--eased. .1th a coaabination of tne luft^-"-ffe and U-boats we
would tnen inflict terrible bloajs on Inglaad. Brxtisn imports
woulc. nave to be reduced by tne .sink ngs to certain level be-
loty tj....e minimuui IrltiS-.. requirements for existence, so as to giv-i
tne situation ti.e proporxions of a c t •a ..ro_,^.^e. preparations
xiad teen m,'de f^r a landing in In^ilaaid, but tuis de^^endent
on various f ctors. a.ooscv^lt w=e G-er aa - ny and Japan's bitte-aest
enemy. But .ye were inoorested in kee^pins amerlca, out of xne war.
-Sac c. of original) l'>6'-88
If 'Uxerio. novert-.eltfss came into ti.e war, sne couia not w--ge
^t, militarily, T-e wide strcccnas of Ooean wniCx± lay betavaen
us -nd aiiierica ma.de t.as imy .stible. In ,pr-ctice tnen, wu-=t it
amounted xo was only t..e cr^at on of .^marxC-n air b-ses in lag-
land, But in aerial w-rfcre w- were in a str tegic 11;.' favouraoi
to e w-.re not onf • ?b e to c: .e
Wltu ' eoubiiHi-tiia a id mpriQm a.ir
•ff&re o?* to -t %w of -jiiotg xm-
l i.witBd, r ad tne g -Sld .;,ooci for /roduotion f ' Siiltiag
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£--i;-'cr:-ft. . . Inorxious r^s-^rves f x-'csri-i wer-r stored u -nd
t.ie sr.ua ; jvXied to st.>oivc of uiunitions. ^^rduct .on w.-s baxn^
coaen'crrtad on xna U-bo-t =r:ii-, t_*a rlr Tix -•id on ..nti--ircr fo
defences. Tne v.) s ncfl won ootn in a miXit'ry, ec-.i-ioinxc,
and i^oXitxcaX sins.-, but we wished soaediXj) do brln^ dxi- w r
xo a cxos., ana oo:n,.aX z:n..t,i--nd to sue for ;a:-ca. xn doii-i t..x3
•"'''ixn _u -pan w:- ^ lui jor'cr.nt.Sne snouXd intw-van^ nn
iicr ovjn interests :s sO'-^n a.s ,> s&ib_e. Txie decisive bXu.v \^ouX
be an a.tta.ck on in ordex- to aestroy sa^lrad's kej
.position in la.sx ^.ia, and ensure J .^/n XxXa ..jusition in u. st
^.sia wnion sne couXd ohX;' anquirc bj w.r. V-.a occu^/tiqn^of _
Sin j^,^ore must taie pXace vjitii txxa s.^ood of xi^-dnln ,, if t
a.xi possibxe wxtnont aecXrratxon of war, . nc. in t.^e miasd of
,aace, so as to x.eX . in bringing about txia sxeedy conciusxon
01 t-.e war, and xo -imeric out of tiie w.-r,
A^mbass aor Oaxii-a repiied tnat ;;reoa.raxxons for tx^e
occU;j?t:.on of 31a,;..era oui.. lia compJ ite "by t....a md of .
in order to be on tne s:=f. side .re.=r-Gions for a=r s..o Id b;
mede not only ?gf.lnst In,i-nd, but also -^pl^'st imerlo.. i
supplying of Jrp-n with r'w materials, .sveoinlly steel -nd
iron w;s difficult, tne buliin., of 45.0,-0 ton sni.s nr.d been
suspended, .=nd instead of t-ese, U-bo^ts, tor .ado-borts, .nd
I-bo.= ts were "beinsi- ouiit for tne .protection of tae isi-nds.
Tae time for tne oocu,,?tlon of Singapore must oe set to fxt in
wiun o.^sr: clons in luro.je. is tne ;.t c.-.ok. ws too dj.f-lcuit
t..e sa?., it wouiL, ..;v, to be c rried o..t from tne land oit.e. i-
.ocu^.-tion of r.oa.>o,g .nd t..e -..xlxp .xnes w. s .Iso rovlded
f^-iT ia Q'ga of need.
4 af ari^.An--l}
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£lone* If r.dequ^t^ axj^l .i.7.Gj,oa iMid rd.-soii5 wera .biven foa? tj-^a
occUjj5-'cion, -JLiiieric: v^ouio. str'/ out of t..e ^rv.. T. a foliov/inyj
t^Jea x*e. soas '.Vora decioiva for Sj^aady a.cCi.oa:
1. Tixc oocuprtion of Siiia.pora uia::-:iit dacisiva oiow
struci: : t-tx-a -iarj:'t of t—a Bntx rxi L-jira.
2, Aiuaricf-. wouia sc:; '^ out of txxa ytB.Vy for sxxc viBS not
•rTiiiad --..dd would noc risd .xar fiaat -(a-t of In
ra^x^rd to -^tiricrn intdrasts Roosavalt "ouid be iaft witnout
Cxxa frsuiuanc of .rastisa for antry into txia Wrr. If sx^a c:iaa
into "caa w:r, ^uario - would otxxarwiaa x'x^va to look on nal^lassly
Wx-iia Ja.pi?n robbed i^ar of txia ^In vs.
c-. For tna fortxiCoain^ i>:aw Crdar in o—a worlc., J.p.n rau-t
sanura for ixorsalf tx_.-c position wnicxx iia would Ixk- to x.olc.
rt txxc coiiclusiou of 'par.oa. ZUr^l.-nd would nava .- n,ive up
j^ora in na^otir.t.xons out ratx.ar contx.nua to fi ^...t to txia aod.
Jjab:-ss?djr Osx^i-.r cp-^ra^d witn tx-asa tx„oorxas to t-^a lulx. -xd
s. id .a vJij.xxad to do avaryti-x-.i.^ t. o.rry t-rou^-x txiis policy,
x-e roiar-rkad txu-t xx^ i.?d asK d txxc; Jr .anasa uinistar of Forai^^n
%ff =4rs to co.ua to jucjrj.in witu t ..a uiost concrato su ,g;-stj.w>as
^ossibxa. I toxd Osxdair txxPt it wouxo ba r ^ood txxia^ ii oxxO
orp.nicse ..xinistar of Forox^n -vff-irs woula brin^ oitxi xxim txxa
fin."l dacibiou for - =.yaad: rttrc.x on Sxiia?.yC>re, txxc.t w^ c.n
t. an dis-uso -11 aet ilo I .urtnar sftad tiift for t. a
joint conduct oi txxa wr txxO closasci,^rx...iicias,„.Prticul-rl./ in i.tal-i^nca.pud txxa press, ..s
=lra-d' bean institi.tad in -.xaiQpl ry iu.nner in tna
/I Txia ^.uib-7SS =dor intcna.
:.ou;U7.nl.-, x-iuna-ry, S-i-ov ii.^ :nd bulo^ ^
•,t - o\-r ^aan for intonsifyma pro ^d.-..
•CO drr.w u.. proar-m itix oir .aan , ^
T- - .t red -d to tx^a US^ I rara-rk^d turt it
witxx rd CO J p.-n. itix
IMn words in -ddrassing nar. T.-.xa ^jit^ric.-n
would be wise to use plrin woras
.. l.v. tor . o„U 3000,t.,., W3 ->• .o-r.o.io..
/i
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Oy^joscd to entdrxa^ t^e vj?r, so as not to sacrifice ..er sons. T-i^;
peojjie of t._e b3-^- insti .c clveiy feit t..?t ..ooseveit :nd jewisn
wirapuiLers wnntad to dr w t.^.m into ti.a ^varn.vit out .n:; reason.
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T..erefore £ oi^rr Jnd stron but qo'i, £a_;,a..,res:xvi _.oi.
uusc be foiiowed in des.iia , -acn t..c uS-s.. x-x ...eopia of t.x USa
must know tnat if txxy -;,ve E.^s-rsssive desires, tney will find
t..ems.ivas ffced wltn E.n iron front of resoiut. ,,aoxlcS, wno
comjrise yr?ot;io. iiy t,.e w-oie world. i.cteni,..ts on ide pErt of
britlsn prop,= a;ind? to distort w,.E-.t v;. s y must be countered by
tne Ci-osest oo-..per "tion. For t.ils pu-pose ? currant excn?aa='
Ideas is neoess.ry m -cne o:se of fundsQentri s.^eecnes ?nd scfta-
liients. I pointed out in tais connection ;.lr-tsuo;i-.»s recent decx:-
rft.-on rag:--ding JEp-'nc-se wiliingaoss to pot rs intermedi,-ry for
eerCe, pnd to tpe stftiment of ti.e Ja.xnese ynb=ss =dor ijiomur? in
\ 6ninieton wit., r^gerd to Ja^xn's rttituda .n t..e evenc of Americ
entering tne w-;r, anen Xpointed out t..:t a ..rd, by fur vioxory
on t..e Continant E.ira^dy contributed ^re-ciy to toe sd=-pin^ of
tna destiny of t..e riiied nEtious ) e,nd t..Et in view^of geo-
er;puiCE.i olvoumstcncee we s.-ouXd also ..eve to bsrv t.-a main
turdan of t..e w:r in tne future, vnxXe J. .sn xd enly to figut
E.gE.inst tne outer circle (perxpi.erxe) of t..e BritxSu iuieir„, .nd
txt Jrpan s,.ouid now tefce t..a .••oloss.?i c^rnce w-J.cn offered it
self fad not sn-y fwey from tne uici.u. ta consequeiicas, Osnia.i re,
piled tnft Jf.,En Wfs determined to mElnt =in ...ar im.erxEi -^ositior.
-e -coid me in confidence tn-rt Kouo"a ?nd ..x isuokE si-fred nls
views, end ware in fs.vour of s. speedy Ettfck on Sin.vpore.
i tx.an discussed tuc t sits c^oacarri.^d :fli;cn_tu6_re-s.ir;;jing
of_Luroxa rna X^st_isiE for c.i= powers of t..a Tri-xrrtl^a Pact
.fter tne w,--r. ov=r-cantr.-lis,-aion must be .-^voidad, and in tne
*) TrE.nslf.tor's note- presumably aem -.ny nd ner oXiiee.
pxiT . sa IS "v-.vbuaudx: - - ,.r oio iiai''.)
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ecoxioiuic fi^la = solution must bs founa on s. brsis of equrlitj.
Frd^ of tr;.ae on :• "boiuiy cono_-ivf.d S(.-ii must -orks
botwaen tne ^r,,.-t i_^-eres of intenast of txxa luropa-ifrlcr.
spiiere of infiusnoa und:.r tna ijodarsixij of jOi'-.xrny md It.iy,
r7,nd tiia x.fi.st -isixnlc sp.xaro of iatarast und=r txi= io;.dorBi^lp
of Jj-p-nn. J=-p?n couid c?r.'y on xaract 'cr da '/Jixn txxe indepsndont
strtes ^f tne Europejn nemlsnpnono -nd oonoluc.s trr.do .-iroamcncs
r.s noretofore, ••=nd Germ-ny :-nd Italy oould act simii ri,- with
tna lnd--pandent countries witnln tne J-p?nese s:pxiere of in
fluence, sucn IS cm .a, Tnalla id, Indochina, etc.. Betv>een tne
tvjo economic ar.e-s should conoed - each other preferences over
tnird p=rtijs.
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..anistori:,! Diractor Womit-'t's dutias wara limited to tuo con
eluding of tne tr.da agreement. Tne broad outline of tx.e new
trade po. icy woM be defined xn beriin by fa. Sconomxo Commissior.
of tne irl-p;.rtlte P ct as already .-reed. I tnen pointed out
txie possible necessity of taking joint ction on recent American
imixertlnence, in order to o^en tne e/es of paovie in xjaeriC: to
t..e situation, .nod perna.ps bring; about, a swl ig,-0Ver of public
o^elnlon towards Isoia.txon. I'l doxn.g so I eX ,ressiy c, lied txie
question a tneorltioai one, and net at Cx-e moment in ,ny y
acute. In takina a.ctio.x, t..e joint breaking, off of diplomatic
relations with tne uSi by the partners of tx.e Irx-p-rtite P ct
mlg-t nave to be ccnsid red. Of otn ,r inulvldua-i questions
w.xicx-x Were touc..ad upon, txie foiio«rn;x, snouid be stressed:
i. Osnim: a-sreed to contact Toxtxo imurdlatel^' wltn ra-
,,:.rd to speeding up the deiiv^lres^of_rubb^ from Indo-C-,in- to
,ier:xany. xt t-e moment efforts are being made by tx.e issuing of
aexrooai.ate instructions, to .com .ly with ixls vequest tha.t tne
decision of txxe Armistio,, Com.axssion, according to Wx.lCx. txxe
/r
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frcHcn V9er^ c"llov*/6d to xirve ^v.O-jo cons of rubber from Indoo.^ina.
for ceiivery to ocner St tes, sn:.uld be modified to pi?.ce tx-e
rubber at ti^e dispos. i of Jr.pr-n.
ki, wit*x regard to tne question of making p;"'-t6nts rvailr-bic
i'li t.xe Economic Co .mission, I rs.ied tna.t Jipa.nese p;-tents b.:;
pi.-ccd r.t our disposa.i a.s return service.
6. In ra.yly to Oshima's question '.^xietiier -'a na.d talked "witii
tiie Russians :*^bout tneir joining ti.e Tn-pr-rtite pact, I said
tnat 'fi6 ixad. Ine Russians na.d sta ^ed tneir \yilli.ig"aoss in prin
ciple, on certain pre-co..-^itions. Among txiase ^^jere tx.c Rus3i::.n
interest in Finland, txie ere: tion of a. closer reldtionsi-ip witii
Bulga.ria, and tne problem of txic Straits. Talks wer^: saill pendi.io
If tnere ha.d been furtner developments in tne nalkans, tney mignt
be continued if n-vcessary.
page 7 of origina.l) X3f^92
Tne *ixis quarantee for Houmania. nad not been mucn liked by the
Russians, but tuey nad j^ut up v/itn it, n-vin^ rog?.rd to our strong
economic interests in tne Balkans, and es.;)ecirlly in j.oum.-ni-n
.jetroii Oshima. on nis part, st~ted tixat Russxa wa.s rc:dy to con
clude a. tre-ty witx- JaoStn on tne condition tn^t t. o lorth Drcn-.-l
in Concessins were given back. Rela.tio .s on tne w.^ole ware good,
the Russians wer a supplying Is'^niaangkaiscxiek *vitn comp.--.rr.tivol,'
little, ;and only agr'.iast payment.
4, Speaiclng of C-ina^, Osniua said that txiere wera two trenc
One wanted to make /anptsc..ing'..iai strang, and txie otner w^s tr:.-in_
to reacii aan undcrs ca.nding witn Tsohiangka isc..xek, j. advis-d tn^-.t
fresx. attem^^ts to reacn an understanding witn Tscixiangk iscnek
snould be doia.yed until txjie j-erman armies nad into r.ction
a^ain, in order that vi/itii t^.e memory of tnc;o:; military successes
fresxx, tne greatest possible consoiitatxon of tx.o rei: tionsxiip
witix Iscxii ngkaiscnek could b-.; -.c^ieiVod, and furoxxer decl red mv-
7/
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self willing ?.lso to strv-ngtxjLcn .?n^tsc.^lngwci' s posi'Cion
if "cnls w.".s desired.
5. Txia -liiibr ssridor :~s±icd for our support wioii ti.e Vicny
uovornment to obt'in eccept nca of tne «J.jiJJ.nase su^^-rotion of_
medxrtlon in t.-6 •T...:.ilr.-ac:~Indoc.nlnas:^ conflict. T-.e request
wrs coiuplied vit^^.
0. liic xirnding over of Oa^Aiir^s credaati. ls to tn-? Fuoxurer
will trka plice on 2b,2. r.t txxa Eergnof.
Rlbbcintrop
Oi-lXiFlC-.Tl OF iRiivSl.-.i. •iM
X, uatty Rica rdsoii, -iuO 40b, ^.Ij-ied Givili:n, i^^reby Ce
ta-t 1 ra r duly xted tr "nslrter for tx^e ^-r.a n : net
Englisa 1 mgu :ad tart taj .bove is ? trua rnd correc
tre.asi"tion of cocurucnt . o i.: e d . ar-.
mi
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' Larch, 3. 1941'. Frame No. 337593
Japan
•I, Conversation Reich Foreign Llnlster OSHIIA. .
Spirit: ,^'As usually extremely friendly and full of confit? ence",
Reich Foreign Llnlster;
Victory hps 'been achieved, on the military front, eco
nomically and politically, 'because there are no more opponents
left on the Continent. England must 'be. forced to understand
that victory for her Is out of the question, and that she
should ask for peace. No occupation of the rest of France
(de Craulle). In spring 24C divisions, amongst them 188 first
class. Earlier later Jugoslavia is going to join the Axis'
camp ^vhlch the entire Balkans alll be In our hajK^.s. Relations
v/lth Russia good. Russia pro'ba'bly "".^ould avoid undertaking
anything against Germany, just considering German strength.
STALIN Is a. cool and shrewd politician. Germany looks uoon
things' In the East with supreme tranquillity. A Germaji Rus
sian conflict,- not wanted 'by us, would result in gigantic
German victory and "be the end of Soviet Russia.
To finish the \'hr quickly, cooper.-tion with Japan
is•Important, and to force England to sue for early peace.
For her o^n sake Japan should strike as soon as possi'ble.
A surprise attack on Slngrporo to annhllate England's key
position In Eastern Asia, anc to secure for Japan a position
she only ca,n acquire through Urr. Occupation of Singapore
should occur with lightening speed, nd If possi'ble without
declari^tlon of V/ar while still at peace, to help finishing
the vVar as soon as possi'ble.
Frame No. 337594
and to keep USA. out of the "Jp.r. Cat random: Actually avai
lable 2 1/4 (and in case Turkey quiet) If surprise action....(some words unreadable) c^ra'^dng up troups accorc'lng to plans
(3-4 weeks)
(The translate This note on Frame No.
erne words rations against Singapore concluded end
nreadable of Lay. Japan not only to prepare a,galnst
ne trans- — Russia 'but also against U.S.A. In raw
ater) -i— materials, capoclally iron and steel,
45,000 by ship could no more, su'bmarlnrs,
— torpedo 'boats, express bo^ts have to 'be
constructedj.Attack ha.s to be timed in accordance wfth opera—
,tions In Europe, because dlfDilcult from ovi rseas. Hongkong
and Phillp'olnes occupation a.lso^ provided for, of necessary.
Reich Foreign Llnlster
t^ut back Philippines. Only Important surprising capture
Singapore. U.S.A. '
1 -
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would stp^y out of Wfir, because not yet armed, and would
not risk fleet west of Hawai; also powerless, seizure
of Philippines. lyioreover if U.S.A. interest remain re
spected, obligation for ROOSEVELT to-enter the Var for
prestige would cease. .
OSHIIviAi-
Shall-do everything to enforce this policy. Ha.ve asked
IViATSUOKA to present propositions as substantial as pos-
•slbl^d. Agree with lATSVOZk and KDNOYE rbout early
Attack-upon Singapore.
Reich Foreign Minister: ^
It is to be hoped that LATSUOKA arrives with definite
decision. - German Japanese cooperation .in propageiida.
Music of the future for after the 'Jar: 2 ,"^Vo•rld,\S;ohcresv
European African under German--Itfeilan leadership, Er.stern
Asiatic under Japajiese leadership. Economic cooperation
with prefered. groups. WOHLTAT' s trip to Tokio for
commercial treaty.
Concerns Russia.; Eventually resuptl-oh..
. Frame No.. 337 595
Three conversations with Russia. "-Willingness on prin
cipal, with certain reservations (Finnlmd, Straits,
Bulgaria. ) '
OSKI-Ivui:
Russia-willing for pact with Japan,- If.-.Japan returns
concessions in North Schalin. , ' ' '
Reich Foreign Minister:
CancerhiTig China
Japan might wait with-agreement efforts with Chiang until
German Army a.gain in action, to bo able to use more
pres-sure. .under-.-impression of success of arms.
Reich.Foreign Minister:
Concerns Conflict Thailand, with Indochina .
RromiBes to influence Vichy in the spirit of Japanese' .Vyjlll
prqpo sal for arrangement <
' • . • - - • ^2 -
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Frame No. 337595
cent
1.)
2. )
II. Japanese £Gr.c£ medl^ti^o^.
liATSUGKA to OTT - by demarche
^iATSUOKA rep:rets English publication of his com
munications to EDEr and false interpretations.
CHURCHILL'S note: English G-overnment could not
agree to any compromise; is fighting for ideals,
humanity and civilisation v'ith the consent- of the
entire english soeaAing i^'orlc' against N3 Regime
which is outwardly marked by la^i'-iessness and force,
internally by odd gruesome tyrany. English G-overn
ment would
Frame No.,337596
extremely regret War with Japan.
3.) i«A.TSUOKA's ans^i^'er: His communication was not
proposed for mediation. Therefore astcnished about
wrong interpretation. Japan loyal to his •" tri.
partite obligations. Proof of 'former loyadty to
alliance with England.
CEiilTlFi Gid'E 01' bLidl'ON
I, Wornor Mcyor, U.S. Civilian AGO 217^^71, hereby
certify that I am' thoroughlSr convorsonf with the
Elnglish and Gorman languages and that the above ia
a true and correct translati^jn of Documont NG~ 4425
- 3 -
END
Wornor Ivicycr
AGO 217^x71
'11!n4d >
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FORSIGH OFFICE
RiJI HO. 56/r
PiiiiTIAL TRii-wSLilTIOi: OF DOGUIffiNT 1834-.PS
OFFICE OF U, S. CHIEF OF GOUTTSEL
Berlin, 2 Ilarch 1941
Striotly'. secret
Personal
In the inolosxirG is forwarded, for strictly confidential and
purely personal information, an extract of a report on my conference
with the new Jopanose /imbasBador Qshime. in Fuschl on 25 February 1941.
These statements are of fundamental si;.-nificance for orientation on the
general political situation facing Germony in early Spring 1941,
To: The German Embassy in
The German Legation in
one each
s i r.ne d j
Ankara
Madrid
Mo s c ov;
Rome (Quir,)
Rome (Vat;)
Ribbentrop
Athens
Belgrade
Bern
Budapest
Bxikarest
Helsinki
Lisbon
Pressburg (Bratislava)
Sofia
Stockholm
65215
I
I'j
1
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Enclosure -t-'— ——ra—^
To RAM No* 56/R S'tric'tly secrei:;
Extract
from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister with
Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.
After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM (Reich
Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved
right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of
the many doubters in Japan. By Germany's victory in the west these
policies had been fully vindicated. Ke (the RAS^,) regretted that the
alliance between Germrjiy and Japan, for which he had been working with
the /unbassador for many years already, had come into being only after
various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for
it earlier* The main thing vras, however, that they are together now.
Expanding upon the general political situation the Reich Foreign
Minister declared; The Fuehrer had always looked for an understanding
with England and he (RAM) had himself been sent to England as an
ambassador in his time to undertake a last attempt in this direction,
A certain possibility had existed in the person of King Edward, even
though it had been doubtful from the beginning whether the king would
prevail* He (the RAI<;I) had been more than skeptical already at his
arrival in London, and had considered the chances for an understanding
as 100 to 1* Thus the war-incitcr clique in England had then won.the
upper hand, Alien he (the iiAIi) loft England war was unavoidable. Then
when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a treaty with Russia -
a necessity for avoiding a two r- front war, Perhaps this moment was
difficult for Japan, The treaty was, however, in the interest of
Japan, for the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German
victory as possible, which was assured by the treaty with Russia,
Furthermore he (the RAIA) had made it clear to Stalin as well as to
the public that the treaty between the Reich and Russia in no way
affected the German - Japanese relationship. Now the German -
Japanese alliance has been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man
who gets credit for it from tho Japanese side. After conclusion of the
alliance the question of its further development now stands in the
foreground. How is the situation in this respect?
*****
As for the war against England, wo had poor weather for our
bombers during the Fall and Winter to be sure, but in spite of this,
heavy damage has been done which has had a strongly retarding effect
on English wo.r production, etc. The bombings would continue in
increasing measure so that we hoped to destroy very much more than
America was able to replace, 7Ce now had air supremacy over the whole
continent. When we should win air supremacy over England would
depend on further developments.
At sea the conunitment of the U •- boat weapon had thus far been
oomparotively slight; aftep the end of March the commitment of the
U-boat weapon would multiply in a short time. Then with the combination
Air Force-U-boat weapon we would deal terrible blows to England, The
loss of tonnage already was making considerable difficulties for the
English food supply. Meat and fats were already scarce. It was now
a matter of reducing imports by sinkings to a definite level below the
absolute minimum for English existenpey Thereby England's situation
would take oat?.strophio shape overnight. The landing in England is
prepared; Its execution, however, depends on various factors, above
all on weather conditions,
Concerning America, the Reich Foreign Minister went on, it must be
noted that Roosevelt is the most bitter enemy of Germany and Japan, As
far as he was concerned he would like to enter the war. However we have
an interest in keeping America out of the v/ar. Should iunerica onter
the war in spite of this it could not wage the war militarily at all*
The vast spaces of the oceans lying between us and America made this
— 2 T
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impossible. In East Asia Amerioa would hardly dare to send its fleet
beyond Hawaii, as it would then be threatened Virith destruction by the
Japanese fleet. In the Atlantic ®cean there is ?. lack of coiranitment
possibilities with the exception of England, Landing in Europe is
impossible but Africa also is too far removed. Supply points for the
fleet and land troops are lacking. It adds up for practical pur;ioses
to the creation of American air bases in England, But in an air war
we are located in a strategically advantageous position with respect
to England, ,Ve could bomb England concentrically from the broad basis
of the European coast while England had to spread out in fanlike
fashion in its attacks on Europe and thereby split up its forces. In
an air duel Europe vs, England - Germany would always be superior,
liG believed, however, that it should be possible to keep America out
of the war by skillfully coordinated politics of the allied powers..
The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her.
Besides cur strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined
English - American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our
disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our airplane production
capacity. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior
to the English (to say nothing about the American) and we were on the
way oven to enlarge this lead. On order of the Fuehrer the antiaircraft
defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since the army had been
supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous reserves had been
piled up (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the
immense stock of material), production woufd now be concentrated on
submarines, airplanes and antiaircraft guns.
Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won to-day
* economically and politically, Y^e had the desire to end the
war quickly ana to force England to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer
was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined to
bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the co—operation
with Japan was of importance. However, Japan, in its own interest, shoulc
oome in as soon as possible. This would destroy England's key position
in the Far East, Japan, on the other hand, would thus secure its
position in the Far East, a position which it could acquire only through
war. There were three reasons for quick action;
1) Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center
of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, etc,). The
effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and
this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war,
2) Asurprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out of
the war. America, which nt present is not armed as yet and would hesitate
greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this
even less so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect the
American interests, there would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt
to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the
Americans, It was very unlikely that America would declare war if it
then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines
without America being able to do anything about it,
3) In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the interest
of Japan also to secure for herself already during the war the position
she wants to hold in the Far East at the time of a peace treaty.
Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that he would do
everything to carry through this rjollcy,
Yie r i '.'I'-AoaciC. rvrtficr thai;, if ^;Tnt;r L-.a should
a-.c, -var h:-.--- .japif.'t -uii 7 ir.f- tbo v; \r ^ trn'f woald m-'in that
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America had had the intention to enter the war sooner or later
anyivay, Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry
into the war would,, as explained above, be by no-means decisive and
would not endanger the final victory of the countries of the Three--
Power Pact, The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that
a temporary lift of the British morale caused by America's entry into
the v/ar would be cancelled by Japan's entry into the war. If, however,
contrary to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough
to send their Navy in spite of all^ beyond Hawaii and to the Far
East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries of
the Three.-.?owe^ pact to bring the war rapidly to an end, .He, the
Foreign Minister,^ is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do
a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this, that^ unfortunately
he does not think the Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a
victory of his fleet in Japanese waters,
^ t
The Minister for Foreign Affairs further explained that closest
cooperation was required for the coramo^i waging of the war, particularly
as far as intelligence service and press were concerned. The
cooperation with the Italians is already exemplary; the same is true
for the cooperation with Rumania^ Hungary and Slovakia, The press,
radio, etc, of these countries were already so synchronized with each
other that they form one single vreapon. The same kind of close
contact must bo established with Japan, The Ambassador welcomed this
and intends to, set up a program with our men determining how our
Japanese propaganda can bo most effectively intensified in all fields.
Ambassador Oshima explained that when the Three-Power Pact lyas
concluded^ various opinions wore still present in Japan, It was then
•that the i^peror intervened with an edict. It must be stated, however,
that, impressed by the German victory in the Yvest, the Japanese people
are now entirely for the Three-Power Pact,
Ambassador Oshima remarked further that in Japein, under the influence
of the events, the hcird feeling against America had risen considerably.
The Reich Foreign Minister referred to the recent statement of
Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in the U,S,A,, concerning Japan's
attitude in CF.se of America's entry into the war, and mentioned
that he considered it appropriate to talk plain language with the U.S,A,
Ambassador Oshima remarked hereto that the Japanese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs had given instructions to that effect. The Minister
for Foreign Affairs pointed out that particularly in view of the
desire to keep America out of the war., plain language must be used.
Only if the U, S, realized that they were confronting firm determination,
would they hold back. The people in the U, S, did not like National
Socialism, However,' they vrare net willing to sacrifice their sons and
therefore were against an entry into the war. The American people
felt instinctively that they were drawn into the war for no reason
by Roosevelt and the Jewish wirs-pullors. Therefore, our politics with
the TJ, S, should be plain and firm, but, of course., not aggressive.
In the U, S, they must realize that Germany, Italy and Japan had no
hard feelings for the American people, but that should the UoSoA^ have
any aggressive desires^ they would confront an iron front of determined
people, a front, at that, which includes practically the whole world.
One would therefore have to work in close cooperation against the
attempts of misrepresentation by the British propaganda. As far as
speeches and addresses of a principle nature are concerned it would be
necessary to keep up a continuous exchange of ideas. In this connection
the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to a recent remark by Matsuoka
concerning Japanese willingness to act as meaiator for peace negotiations.
This remark had been extenaivoly exploited by the enemy propaganda,:
- A ..
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The Heich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was
Japan's friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-
Comintern Pact was concluded^ On the other had, Japan- had been able to
penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interest in China,
Germany's -victcry on the continent has brought nowj after the conclusion
of the Three Power Pact, great advantages for Japan, France, as a
power* was eliminated in the Far East (Indochina),' Enland too was
considerably weakened, Japan had been able to cla^e'& steadily on
Singapore. Thus, Germany had calready contributed?'enormously to the
shaping of the future fate of the two nations. Due to ouf geographical
situation we should have to carry the main burdeii of the final battle
in the futurej, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia should arise
we should have to carry the main burden also in this case. If Germany
should ever weaken Japan would find itself Confronted by a world-
coalition within a short time, vie wore all in the same boat. The
fate of both nations was being determined now for centuries to come.
The name was true for Italy, The interests of the three countries
would never intersect, A defeat of Germany would also mean the end
of the Japanese imperialistic idea.
Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and .
emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial
position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great
problems which would arise after the war for the parties of the
Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in Europe and East
Asia* The problems arising then would require a bold solution. Thereby
no overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be
found on a basis of parity* particularly in the economic realm. In
regard to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that
a free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of
interest on a liberal basis. The European^i'kfricon hemisphere under the
leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian sphere of interest
under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan
would bonduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the indepen
dent states in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while Germany
and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with the
independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such as China,
Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic
spheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with
regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with this
thought,
The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly
pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be
refliuired^ on the basis of new affronts by the U, S, A,, to break off
diplomati<p relations, Germany and Italy were fimdamentally determined
on thisf after signing of the Threo-^Pcwer Pact we should proceed if the
occasion arfses* but also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should
open the eyes of the people in the U, S, A, to the situation and iinder
certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public
opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America
found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory
powers should be exploited corresp-ondinrly in propaganda, The question,
however, was in no way acute at the time,
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Report RiiM 19/41
REPORT ON IKE CONVERS^^TION BEFwlIEN THE REICH
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN IFF-.IRS (JCM) iiND THE
JHP^TESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKl IN BERLIN
ON -S? NG^RCH 1941.
The RGIvI resumed the preceding conversation 7?ith MGTSUOiGi.
about the latter's impending talks with the Russians in
I.Iosco-/, where they had left off. He expressed the opinion,
that it would,probably be best, in view of the whole situation;
not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far.
He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing,
hov/ever, was certain, namely that Germany v/ould strike im
mediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready
to give M/iTSUOKa. this positive assurance, so that Japan
could push forward to. the South on SINGAPORE, without fear
of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of
the Geiman aimy was anyi-vay on the Eastern frontiers of the
Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at any time.
He ( the RIM) however believed ,• that Russia would trjr to
avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany however,
enter into a conflict with Russia", the USSR would be finished
off within a few months. In this case, Japan had of course
even less reason to be afraid than ever, if it wants to
advance on Singapore. C'jnsequently, it need not refrain
from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.
Ho could not kno?; of course, just how things with Russia
would develop. It was uncertain, whether or not STGLIN would
intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany.
He ( the ItiM) wanted to point out to M-.TSUOK.V in any case,
that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the Xr^alm of
possibility. In any case, MiiTSUOIli- could not report to the
Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between
Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the
situation was such, that such a conflict, even if it were
not probablp, would have to be considered possible.
3CXXXXXXX3PX
( Page 46767 to Page 46769, Lino 18 )
Next, the H'ivl turned again to the Singapore question.
In view of thejfears, expressed by the Japanese of possible
attacks by submarines, based on the FHILLIPPI^'IPS and of the
intervention of the British Mediterranean and Home fleets,
he had again discussed the situation with GEN_JLiL-GC^(!LELiX
R-'ulDER. The latter had stated, that the British Navy during this
year would have its hands so full in the English home waters and
in the Mediterranean, that it would not'be able to send even a
single ship to the Far East. General-hdmiral RiGEDER had described
the U.S. submarinos as so bad, that Japan need not bother ahout
them at all.
LLiTSUOIM. replied immediately, that the Japanese Navy had a '
very low estimete of the threat from the British Navyj it also held
the view, that in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would
be able to smash the latter without trouble. However it was afraid,
that the nracricans' would not take up the battle with their fleet;
thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged
out to five
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years. This possihility caused considerable worry in Japan.
The R-\M replied, that Amorica could not do anything
against Japan in the caso of tho capturo of Singaporo.
Porhaps for this reason alone, ROOSE\''SLT would think twice
boforo dociding on active measures against Japan, For
while on ono hand ho could not aohievo anything against
Japan, on tho other hand thoho was the probability of los
ing the Philippines to Japan; for the i'micrican president,
of course, this would moan a considerable loss of prestige,
and because of the inadequate rearmament, he would have
nothing to offset such a loss.
In this connection, RtiTSUOKA pointed out, that he v/as
doing everything to reassure tho English about Singaporo.
Ho acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this
key position of England in the S;.ST. Thoreforo It might
bo possible, that his attitude toward the British would
appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However Ger
many should not bo decoived by that. Ho assiamed this
attitude not only in ordor to reassure tho British, but also
in ordor to feel the pro-British and pro-/imorican elomonts
so long, until ono day he v/ould suddenly open tho attack on
Singapore.
In this c.onnoctlon, MATSTJOKA stated, that his tactics
wore based on the certain assumption, that the sudden attack
against Singaporo would unito the entire Japanese nation
with ono blov;, ("Hothing succoods like success," tho PtAM
remarked. ) Ho followed hero tho oxamplo of tho words of a
famous Japanese statesman, addrossod to the Japanese Navy
at tho outbreak of tho Russo-Japanoso war: "You open firo,
thon tho nation will be united""! Tho Japanoso nood to be
shaken up to awaken. After all, as an oriental, ho be- i
liovod in tho fato, which would come, whether you wanted it
or not.
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TtiTSUOKii then introduced tho subject of Gorman assist
ance in tho blov/ against Singaporo, a subject, which had
Doon broachod to him frequently, and montlonod the proposal
of a Gorman written promise of assistance.
Tho Ra.M replied, that ho had already discussod thoso
questions with ..mbassador OSHIri'i, Ho had asked him to
procuro maps of Singaporo in ordor that tho FUHRSR - who
prooably must bo considered tho greatest expert on military
questions at tho present timo - could adviso Japan on the
best method of attack against Singapore. German exports
on aerial v/arfare, too, would bo at her disposal; thoy
could draw up a report, based on their European oxpDriences,
for tho Japanoso on^tho uso of dive-bombers from airfields
in tho vicinity against the- British floet in Singaporo,
Thus tho British fleet would bo fiorced to disappear from
Singaporo immodiatoly.
TliTSUOK^x remarked, that Japan was loss concernod with
tho British floot, than with tho capture of the fortifichtions,
Tho R..M replied, that hore too, tho FUilRER had dovolop-
od now methods for tho Gorman attacks on strongly fortified
positions, such as the Maginot Lino and Fort Ebon Emaol,
which ho could make available to the Japanoso,
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M.;TSUOia roplied in somo of thoyounger, export .Japanese Javul o i "?rionds'org?s, woro of the opinion that the Japanese naval-
forces would noed throo could captureurix in--' —- . , TL wo.^
Singapore. As a cautious foreign minister, he had doubled
this estimate. Ho boliovod, ho could stave off any danger
v/hich threatened from American, for^six months. if, how
ever, tho capture of Singapore required still more time and
If tho oporations would perhaps even drag out for a year,
tho situation with /miorloa would become extremely critical
and ho did not know as yat how to meet it.
If at all avoidablo, he would not,touch the hethorland-
Bast Indies, since ho was afraid that in case of a Japanese
attack: op this area, the oilfiolds would bo set aflro.
They could be brought into operation again only after 1 or
2 years.
Tho YUM added, that Japan would gain decisive in-
fluenco over tho Kothorland East Indies sinultanoously with
tho capture of Singapore.
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Attached raemorandura about measures of the Bpanish-^imerican
countries against German ships submitted to
Reich Foreign Minister.
The measures against German commercial ships are the result
of the flaming up of action instigated by Washington. Further
excesses against German property an.d German nationals on the
American continent are to bo expected. Washington's political
goal, of course, is to attain the breaking off of relations
between Germany and the countries concerned. For us, therefore,
it is a matter of carrying through to the end the matter of the
question of guilt, in such a way that wo will be representod,
step by step) as the ones attacked. This is necessary in
deference to our allies, especially Japan.
The various protests are to be v/orded accordingly. F\in-
damental agreement with Rome is necessary. Before breakii^ off
relations VJith Feru, more detailed information should be obtained
regarding the pursuit of tho tvio ships, the **Munchen" and the
"Hermontes".
To;
signed * Woizsaecker
.ambassador fitter
Under Btate Secretary Political
Director Political
.iKibassador Dieckhoff
Director Press
Director Legal
Director Gomraercial Political
Pol IX a, b
commercial political Xtl
Pol XI
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Notes Fueh 20/41
regarding the discussion betv?een the FJL^SFR
and the Japanese Foreign tiinister -IvrGOOtCa-
in the presence of the Reich Foreign .iinister
and of the ivlinister of State *»EI5SNiR in Berlin
on the 4th of April I941.
Hatsuolta. further .mentioned, that he was induced to ,^lce those
endeavours for peace particularly In view of the personality of
Cardinal a^SP-iRI.
Furthemore he had endeavoured to convince tne FOjS, that the
Cnited States and particularly the ^.aerican Fresident prolonged the
war in iiurope and in China. It was not the question to deterninc-, if
America or its President were right or wrong- Tney certainly had
their definite reasons for their policy, Notwitnstnnding the question
of right or wrong one had to state the fact, that they prolonged the
war in Surope and in China, In regard to China he tried to convince
the POP^, that Japan was not fighting the Ghinese or China herself,
but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and
in the entire far Fast, It is regretful that ^imerica and ISngland
sided with Bolshevian,
The FCJEdRniR interrupted that both countries al3o sided in Spain with
Bolsheyisa*
.liATSUOKA then-dlso expressed the request, that the FCJAHRCR
should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as bread-<iiaded^y
as possible the wishes of the Japanes ulilitary Gomiaission, Japan was
in need of German help particularly concerning the IT-boat war fare,
which could be given byma'dng available to them the latest experiences
of the war as well as the latest technical ivUprove.mcnts and inventicma,,
Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States,
In case that the country should decide to attacx Singapore, the Japanese
navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the Jnited States,
because in that case laorica probably would side vjith Great Britain,
He (eiatsuo'ca) personally believed, that the Gnited States could bo
restrained by diplomatic exertions frcm entering t'ae vwar at the side of
Croat Britain; .*riiiy and Nacy had, howc-ver, to count on the worat
situotion, that is with war against •'^crce. fhey v.'^ cro of the opinion
that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would t-dco
the foirn of guerilla a'orfare in the pacific and would be fougnt' out
in the South Sea, For this reason the Germah wxporlcnccs in her gu-rilla
warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question 'ao^^ such
a war would best be conducted and how all the techxiical improvemeiits
of submarines, in all details s£ich as poiriscopes and such li-.oe, could
best be -exploited by Jap^on.
To sum up, abtsuo'ia requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that
the proper Gorman authorities would place at the disposal of the Ja
panese those dovolopaents and inventions concernin.g navy m d army,
which were needed by the Japanese.
The Fuelxrer promised this aid pointed out that Germaiy too considered
a conflict -.vith the iJnitcd States undesd.nble, but that it had already
made allowances for such a contingency- In Germany one \7as of thc^ opinion
that .imerica's contributions depended upon the pos;£iibilities of trans
portation, and that this again is conditioned by t"me available tonnage,
Germany's war against tonnage, however, mai-ms a decisive weakening not
merely against JSngland, b"ut also against .*mcrica. OGoimaiy has made hor
preparations so , that no Vimerican could land in S-uropo,. She would
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ccsiduct a.most onLXgetic fight against America: ivitliihor H-boats and
her LuftT7affe, and due to bcr superior experience, v/nlch would still
have tp be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior,
and that quite apart from the fact, tiiat the German soldiers naturally
r^hhp ^sigh. above the -mierican.
In the further course of the discussion the -t '^uchrcr pointed out,
that Germany on her part would immediately ta'ze the consequences, if
Japan v/ould get involved with, the United States. It did not iiiattcr
with T/hcm the United States would first get involved if with
Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country
at a. time, not to ccme to an understanding with the other country
subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore
Gcimany would stri'we, as already mentioned, without delay in case of
a conflict between Japan and *america, because the strength of the
tripartite powers lies in their joined action,' their wcaXness wouid
bc.ff they would l<-t themselves be beaten individually.
Xiatsuo'aa once more repeated his request, that the .tiuoiir^jr might
give the meccssary instructions, in order that the proper Gorman
authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latws
improvoments and inventions, which are of interest to them.
the Japanese navy had to prepare ioinediately for u conflict witn Cx e
United States.
.iS regards Japones - -mierican relationsaip, wiatsuo'ia explain^
further that he has always declared in his country - tnat sooner or
later a war with the United States would be anavoi'..iable, if Japan ^
continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict
would happen rather sooner than later, iiis arguaontation went on,
wh^: should Japan, therefore, not decisively striiiC' at the fignt moment
and taho the rish upon herself of a figat against -imericav Just thus
would she perhaps avoid a war for goncratipas, particularly if she
gained prdclo.uinancc in the South Seas. Thci''^ are, to be sure, in Ja
pan many who hesitate to follow those trends cf tnought. i.Iatsao'.ca was
considered in those circles a dong^jrous men with d,:ngorous thoughts.^
do, however, stated, that, if Japan continued to wal'i along her prcs^n
path, one day she would have to fight,anp-voy and tnat this would then
be under less favorable circumstandcs tuan at present.
The 5\ichrcr replied that he could veil understand tiie situation o
i.iatsuo'.2i, because he hi.aself was in similar situations (the clearing
of the Rhinoland, declaration of sovcreigiiit;y of armed Forces.. Ho too
was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and ^
accept the ris-c of an anyhow unavoidable fig:ht at a time when no hmm-
sclf was still young and full of vigor. How rignt he was in his
tudo was proven by events. Aurope now v^s free. Ho would not hesitate
a moment to instantly reply to any v/idi-ning of the war, be it by
Russia, bo it by -tnorica. Rrovidonco f ivorocL those who will not let
dangers cone to thca, but who will bravely face them.
.viatauo'.aa replied, that the United States or rather tmcir ruling
politicians had i''occntly still attempted a last manoeuvre towards Jap.on#
by declaring that -*:aorica would not fight Jspan on account of China or
the South Seas pcovided that Japan gave free passage to the consign-neii^
rubber and tin to .'imorica to their place of destination. However , ..uoeri
would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered^the war
with the intention to assist in the destruction of Groat Britain..
Such an ar,gumentatlou naturally did no'fc.niiss its effect upon the Japa
nese, beoauee of the education oriented on Znglisa lines which many
had received..
The Fuoliror oo.mmcntod on this, that this attitude of -iiuorica did
not moan anything but that the United States had the hope, that,
as long as the British World Empire existed,, one day they could ad-
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vancc against Japan together uith Great Britain "nereas, in case of the
collapse of the \/orld hnpire, they v.'ould bo totally' isolated and could
not do anything against Japan.
The Reich Foreign Minister interjected tnat the -Jiaericans jBTocisely
under all circuiastancGS v/anted to i'aaintain the poTicrful position of
England in East ^sia, but that one the oth^J•r hand it is proved by
this attitude, to \7hat extent she fears a joint action of Japan and
Germany..
Matsuo'ia continued that it sconcd to him of importance to give to
the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside
Japan. For this reason ho also had to inform him, regretfully of the
fact that ho (Matsuo'mi) in his capacity as Japanese Minister fcr Foreign
.iffairs could not utter in Japan itself a single \7ord of 3,11 that ho
had oxpouiidod before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regar
ding his plans* This would cause him serious dm age in political and
financial circles. Once before, he had coamitted the miatebc, before
he bodamcJ^paoGc^ Minister for Foreign affairs, to tell a close friend
something about his intentions. It. seems that the latter had spread
these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which ho as
Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule ho
always tells the truth. Under those circurastances he also could not
indicate, how soon he could report on the q.uestions discussed to the
Japanese Itreaicr or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly
and carefully in-the first place the dovolopuent in Japan, so as to
malcG his decision at a favorable moment, to ma-ca a clear breast of
his proper plans tov/ards the Prince dUl-JOTL add the Euporor. Ihcn the
decision would have to be made within a few dgys, bec-iuso the plade
would otherwise bo spoiled by t jlix.-
Shjuld ho, Matsuo'ca, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be
proof that he is lac'mng in influence, in power of conviction, and in
tactical capabilities. However,shoaldi he succeed, it would prove that he
had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident thr.t he v/ould
succeed.
On his return, being questioned, he woul indeed admit to the Eui
pror,, the Premior and the Ministers for the Navy and the .*rmy, that
Singapore had been discussed; ho would, however, state- that it-w-as
only on a hypothetical basis.
Besides this Matsuo'.ca made the express request not to cable in the
matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that by cabling
souething might lealc out. If necessary he would send a courier.
The iuoiirer agreed and assured after all, that he could rest
entirely assured of German reticence.
Matsuolca replied he believed indeed in Gor.uan reticence, but-
unfortunately could hbt say the s-me of Jap'm.
The discussion was terain ?>ted after the exchange of some personal
parting words.
Berlin,, the 4th of ^^pril. 1941*
signed t SOiMIDX'.
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Ivbtos in the telk bcttrccn t>-c Kcich Foreign iinistor ?.nd
the Fap^.iicav Foreign Canister J:nt: rho. in Berlin m 5 -ipril. 19^2"
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hAts'-fk". then npehc of the goncr-rl high rprnlc in Gcrniony
referring "lo the hnppy fnccc ho hod seen oycry?;hcrc oriong the
TTorlars dring.his recent vieit to the Borsig V/orks, Eo cxproseod
his regrc thnt developiuciits in Jnpen hnd net ns yet n.dvnnced ns
for as if: Geinaany onid that in his coecitry the intclioctunls still
cxcrcisGi consiaor;-ble influence.
l%o Rcoch Foreign, hlinistcr replied -that at best a nation
T7hicJ: f.:.d realized its every ambition could afford tiic luxury
of iiykllect'vials, most of nhom ere parasites, •in;>a;ay, h natibni
horovs,?. aiiich has to fi.giit for a place in the su:?. must give thcxa
up, ne intellectvr.ls ruined France; in Geru'uiy they had already
starbod their pernicious activities uhen iMationel Socialism put a-
st.'P fco these doiiigoj they v;ill surely be the criUco of the doen-
fr-.el of Britain, v.-hich is 'to bo expected nith, cert.".inty.
In ansv;er to a remark by Jifr.tsnoka, that Japan r/ns nov;
arn.lening and, •accordl ng to the Japanese torpor;uucnt, -..Auld take
a.T^ion quickly -.fter the previ-nis lengthy dcllbcr'tion, the Heich
Foj'cigii ijieistor replied t- t it -.;ia necv^fis-.ry, of co;n''oo, to
actcpt a certain risk in this eo-nection, just as the Fuhrcr had
danc so successfully rith the occupation pf the Ehineland rith
proclmatlon of sovereignty 'if am:...':er,t, u-d r.'ith thw rosigna-
t.^.on from League of nations.
^pages,5 to 11)
Llie Reich Forcipn !Ci.nist„r replied that the ncu Gorrnn Reich
TTould actually he built up on the basis of the ancient tr'idit.'lons
pf the Holy Ro.n-ir- En-.pire of the Gcrmu: iJatio;; , nhioh in its time
ras tnc only dorrirr;r-t pov/er o:i the Furopcan Con'tinent,
. . In coi^clu^-ioni thi. Reich jHm''eig.a ilLniatcr «nce again suemar-ized tne points ho v.-.ntcd Ir.tsiiok,. to .take b-.ck to Jauan v:ith hin ^
from his trip:
1) Gern-.a.y had alre'dy won the \7-r. '^ith the end of this '
yeoo? the -.vorld v:ould re".lize thin, Eve;;. En-gland v.ould
have to cor.code it, .if it had pot c-llnps-wd hoforo then,
".nd .;n.kc.eic'i -./ould also have tc resign herself to this
fact.
2) There were no conflicting intcexsts betueen Japan and
G^.run'.y, iJic future of both cou:-,tries could be regu
lated for the I.?-;-- run on the basis th"t Jnp".n should
prodcnin te ii. ti. Far E. ot,. ItMy .-.nd Cer::._ny in
Europe -.nd ifri c •;,
•r
3) .••/b,'7t^r/.r rsight h -.pp.„e,, rreeT;niy •..•a-.ad v.'in the v-r. But
it would hasten victory if Japa?; -..'Giad entei- the v;7a>
Such .an, entry into the '.;ar was luidoubtcdiy more in the
int^nr-cst of Jap-.n than in that ©f Germany, for it
o.ffered a uniqu..^ opportiuiity v/hich would h"rdly ever
retm-n, fox' the fulfillr.k,..t pf the n-.tion.eX objectives
J-.p'ui, a oh'rice i.hidi v.'ould uak;, it pfflssibli^ fpr h^r
to play a reall:,' lending xolt.: in East j*sta.
-» IW
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ICatsiiclcf. ^replied that he hiinjelf could r-uly repc-.t th' t he
had long b'^c:: of the ppireLon th-.t every n.-itior. v:culd be offered
an opportunity only once in a thousT.d .years. Japan nas ccrifront-'
iiig such an opportu'^ity, and she v:o'.ild h-.ve to '^ss^jcic the risk
coiinectod uith it. L>hc \7Quld have to act decisively at the right
moncnt in order to take advcntage of this uniaue cppcrtunity.
C.
Berlin, the of -Ipril l?i;l
3ig. CcliLudt
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vioG y Jt; dex'CT.iL. coiioex iiiil Lao I'GGent
c-urae oi; Oi-,ucricdn-Japanese^negotiations
about •which, the Japanese government informs
us currently:
In the middle of April '-.Washington
made proposals to the Japanese govern
ment for the conclusion of a secret en
tente in order to restore friendly re
lations and to prevent a' spreading of the
war to the Pacific^'The proposal contained
the following 4 main points:
1) Pledging of both states not to enter
the European war on their own initi
ative.
S) Aj2ierican influence on Chiangicaishek for
the purpose oi an understanding -with
Japan.
.3) Kestoration of normal trade relations
and cooperation for the exploitation of
raw materials in the South Seas.
4) American recognition oi Ivianchuko and a
•Japanese-American guarantee of the sta
tus quo in the Philippines.
On the 5th of iviay, Matsuoka had sent
an intermediary- report to Hull in which,
aocording to a description
(page 2 of original)
of his impressions in Europe, he conclud-^
ed^with a remark that Japan could do no
thing and intended to do nothing vjhich on
ly could, in the very slightest degree, in
fluence the position of Italy and Ge^^many
with whom Japan on the basis of the Three
Power Pact is bound in ties of honor.
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On the ISth of May Noriura received further instructions
from the Japanese government •which contained Hhe follovving
ideas for the proposed'agreement:
Japan and America will unite their forces to prevent a
spreading of the European v;ar and to restore peace, Japan^ be
lieves that the Three Power Pact would prevent the partici
pation of additional nations in the ijuropean war, The_J3-pa- -
nese government declares that there is no doubt that in the
case of Article 3 of the Hxree Power Pact the engagement to
military support according to the Three Power Pact will^be
come effective. The United States declared that she neither
now nor in the future will taice any aggressive measures "with
a view to helping any nation against,another. They will imme
diately ask Chiangkaishek to negotiate with Japan for peace.
Both governments will take the necessary steps to restore
normal t:ade relations. They"mutually guarantee independence
of the Philippines which must permanently remain neutral.
Japanese immigrants s'hall have equal rights with other fo
reigners.
Simultaneously with this instruction i-atsuo.ka notified
Hull that this would^rest upon the contention that the United '
States would not enter the European war and_that they would i
influence Chiangkaishek to enter directly peace negotiations
with Japan. Only upon this condition can Japan arrive at an
agreement as contemplated. -• i
I
#
A few days after the notification of this instructioii
to Nomura, the British and American ambassadors asked from
Matsuoka a declaration that the establishment of a convoy
system by American would not come under Article 3 of the
Three Power Pact, Matsuoka informed us he had made it clear
to .both guabassadors that the convoy system could af any time
be regarded by- the signatories'to the Three Power Pact as an.
indirect attack and Japan then would fulfill its treaty obli
gations. The American ambassador called this standpoint
. (page 3 of original)
of Mcitsuoka^s a grave and far-reaching implication.
On the SVth of May lvImu&u.oka notified that according to
Nomura's telegram the American reply to the Japanese position
was to be expected in the next days. Wo uon'o x^now whether •
this reply in the meantime has reached Toivio.
0.1 uiie 30th of May M.-tsuoka in a public declaration re
newed the Three Povver. Pact on an unchangeable basis for the
Jc-panese foreign policy; the declarations defined J-oanese
policy in that:.
1) that the bases of the policy are established and no changes
have taken place,
2) that clearly not the slightest divergency from "the Tiii-ee
Power Pact has taken place,
N.';:, • 3) that 'it is entirely Impossible to assume that J..pan can
/•" diviate in the slightest from the faithful fulfillment of
her committments in the T :roe Po, sr ?:.ov>
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4.) tliat Japan's peaceful South Sea policy possibly has to be
revised after the international developments oi this poli
cy become impossible.
Indiscrete reports in the Neyj York Tmes of the 6th of
June indicate that the American goverdinieno no ^onger regards
its proposal'to Japan as hopeful, yet the" deveiopment'of the-
matter"pails, 'nevertheless, for great watchfulnessLIn this
.respect it is to'be considered that certain court'and econo
mic circles in Japan have favored a positive attitude toward
the American proposals. Before all Nomura appears to belong
to those leading elements which intend to estrange Japan from
the policy of the Three ^Power Pact and who are striving for
an American-Japanese understanding; for this reason greatest
caution with respect to him has to be exercised.Por our partj
we have together "with the Italians most emphatically influenc
ed Matsuoka in order to strengthen him and the Japanese go
vernment in their positive attitude.
Please cable as soon as you have'made any important ob
servations in connection with this matter.
/s/ RIBBLNTROP
Itiitiiileto
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Telegram (Secret Code V)
Tokyo, 5 1941 1.25 Kr.
Received 5 May 1941 ^eolS Hr•
No, 675 4 May 1941
Clttiss^le
'For the A.;ich Minister
:The Japanese Foreign Minister has advised me just now
concerning the proposal of the VvMr-v.ington government with re
ference to .the conclusion of a secret entente between the^
United States and J.-pan. Wi;.shington regards an the purpose of^
this step the restoration of friendly relations and the.pre
vention of the spreading of the war in the Pr^ific.
It makes in this" connection four main proposals:
1) Japan and America bind themselves not to enter the Euro
pean war on their own initiative and to diroct"their policy"
exclusively for defense,
2) America influences G-.ixp.j.x.^ Kai Shek to come into an agree
ment with Japan directly.
,3) Roc-oration of normal Japanese and A^^xdcan trade relations;
cooperation and exploitation of raw materials in the Sou"m"t\3ecis
4) A'-crlcan recognition of wMjichuko and Japanese-American gua
rantee for a status quo in the Philippines,
The,American proposal dated 16 April is being examined now
The Foreign Minister assured me that he woaJ.d object to any. po-'
sitien that might not ,be" in accordance with the Tnree Povver
Pact, Today 1 sent Admiral Nomura an intermediary report for
the Washington government with reference to this position.
The text of this intermediary .report and my position in entire
matter follows: The Italian ambassador was at the same time
notified by Platsuoka and asKs for confidential treatment. The
Japanese L.nbassadors in Berlin and Rome have not yet been
notified.
/s/ OTT
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Telegram {Secret Code V)
ToKyOj 6 May 1941
Received 7 May '1941
11.10 S
1.00 Hr/
No.635 6,5 Citissimet
Followijag telegram No. 676 '5 -May
For tiis Reich Foreign Minister
Today I have a long conversation v;ith Matsuoich in vdiich
I__ pointed" out the various points of view brought up in the
preceding telegram. Matsuoica agreed with my', train of thought
and asked me to reporr his opinion on the present situation
to the Reich F'oreign Minister as follows:
He read yesterday _the speech, of the Fuehrer and he is
most impressed by the assurance and '.7isdom oi his remarks.
On the other side it appears to him that Roosevelt in his
hysterical attacks has completely lost his head. Under the
influence of the Fuehrer's speech-ho s^nt a telegram through
the laparssc Emhassy in Berlin to the Reich Foreign Minister
a copy o", which he gave me,
' I
Passing to a discussion of the "general situation Mat- .
suoka declared that he'"wanted to discuss the Ataerican propo
sal Yjith me as soon as he convinced the controlling inner
political offices. The American proposal originates in a re
port sent to Vvashington by the Anierioan ambassador in Mcs-
co"w Viihoea he- has known for a long time, and with vJhem he had a
long candid talk in Moscow on the return trip. Th© American
ambassador, who makes no secret ol his critical attitude, has
posed the question to him; what would Japan do in case'of the
entry of the United States into the vjar. His ansvjor was that
Japan would hniiiedlately in the, same way enter the war on the
side of the Axis Powers.
(page S of original)
The ambassador then tried to weaken' his attitude to the ex
tent that he would in his report to w'ashingtoh describe the'
Japanese entry as' possible. He (.Matsuoka), nevertheless,
emphasized in the clearest manner that then the Jacanese
would fight.
Already on the return trip to Tpkyo he .expec'tbd an Ame
rican counter-move and on his arrival he lound the American
proposals vHiich he had m.ntionbd to.mu and vvhich makes an
appeal in a very clever way tb the needs of certain inner po-
liticalcc?.rcles. At first not only the industries but also
the higher navy leadership was inclined.to a serious dis
cussion ol the American proposals. He had used the inter
val to \';ork on the admirals especially in re;_,ard to aggres
sive younger officer circles of the army and navy who would
firmly reject such a policy.. On Saturday a council consist
ing of t^he Chancellor, Minister of tho.Inoerior Hiranun^
and Chief of the Army Placo'D had given a tentative answer '
••*1
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to the proliuiinary report and had given him a vote of confi-
donccc Ncvofthelcssj the handling of the American proposal
will lead us to tensions with Gcdnomic circles- He vjants to
try to operate so tactfully that America vjill not participate
in the European v\iar particularly since he has secured the im
pression from the Euehrer's speech that German policy follows
aims of this goal- Nevertheless5 he has only faint hopes'in
this- respect sinco he personally assumes that American develop
ment in the direction of entry into the war will become acce
lerated- He examines at the moment v^hother also patrolling
activities of the American forces''with an individual tenden
cy to create American security zones would not require Japa
nese protests.
in view of the forthcoming unavoidable inner political
conflicts, he would be grateful if the position of the Heich
Foreign Minister with respect to the American proposals
would bo made known to him as soon as possible,
Vvith respect to the conclusion of a Hussien-Japanese
neutrality pact, Matsuoka told us that at first after his de
parture from Berlin ho had not reckoned with the possibility
of such a conclusion. In discussion vjith the Reich Foreign
Minister
I
' •, (page 3 of original) '
ho had also expressed himself in this r^spoct and declared
himself willing to accept it only in the event of Russian
willingness- The neutrality pact, in his opinion, is a pro
duct of Russian fear of Germany, xic found only absolutely
peaceful intentions on the side of Stalin- Stalin had assured
him that there can be no talk of any dealings on the p art
of Russia with the Anglo-Saxon powers- In order to prevent
such dealings also in the future was one of his.(Matsuoka's)
reasons for the conclusion of the neutrality pact- According
to Stalin's explanation the Soviet Union'had not become a
party to the .hree Power Pact since the Allied Povjers do not
need Russian help- If necessary, however, Russia is willing
to cooperate exclusively with the Three Pov;er Pact Powers-
Upon my observation that the Soviet Union wanted to protect
its rear and in response to my question as to what position
Japan would take with respect to American deliveries of war
material via "Vladivostock in case of a German Russian conflict,
Matsuoka answered as follows:
No Japanese Ghancellor or Foreign Minister would ever
be in the position ,to keep Japan neutral in case Germany
should come into conflict with the Soviet Union-^wLn this case-
Japan would be driven by natural necessity to attack Russia
on the side of Germany. No neutrality pact could change that.
Matsuoka finally expressed his view that Araerican entry into
war couir force the fuehrer to the decision to solve the
-Russian question by force in'order to firmly secure areas
supply, since the war then would be ^^xpected to last longer.
He personally is convinced o.f the quick victory of "Gorman
arms in this case. • ^
/s/ OTT
-•r
' ' ' • I
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He tha^nked'RIatsuoka for his open exposition and assured
him that he would ask the Heich Fo^eig-Ci Minister to take a
position as soon as possible.-
Naturally-.T continued in today's discussions my efforts
to direct the Japanese policy against Singapore despite
American maneuvers and despite the eve'r-present Japanese
inclination before all against itussia.
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Telegram (Secret Code V)
Tokyo, 11 May 1941
Received 11 May 1941
Nq. 724 11.5»
9.35 Brs
17.30 Hr.
0 i t 1 s s 1 m e
For the Reich Foreign Minister \
Mktsuoka ^.u.st told me that the Japanese ambassador has
urged Washington by telephone for an early reply, Matsuoka
added that according to reliable reports that Roosevelt on i
the 14th of May before the Pan Anei'ics-n union Vvlll announce .
the establishment of a convoy system. An American cabinet
member confidentially has said that the beginning of negoti
ations between Japan and A;-erioa vjill delay this decision,
under these circumstances he will now pose the preliminary
question which he mentioned to me to the American Covernment.
He will undertake the voting and' taking of position of the
Axis immediately after the posing of the preliminary question.
I stated to Matsuoka in a very emphatic way that the
German government could not approve this unusual procedure,
thereupon he agreed to wait with a dispatching of the in
struction Washington until Monday noon Japanese^time.
Ask for cable directive by special communication
Please contact Lumediately through staion D L Y ,
P D X cr' D L D .
Notice": •
Under no
; I
/s/ OTT
1480 relay to the RAM.
11.5.41, 17.50 hrs.
Tel.Ktr.
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Coht'd)
Btii'lin, 15 May- 1941
To the Reioh pDi-eign Iiiuister
by cable with ^reference
Position of .the State Secretary to the cable reports
Toicyo 731, 732, 733 (Text' Japanese-American treaty) »
I. Any political treaty between J--.pan and, the United States
is undesirable at presents The text of the treaty, however,
in its present form would mean that Japan withdravvs from
us= 'It would leave us alone on the battle field against
England and the UiJited States® Tue Tnree PoV6r Pr:,ct would
be di"credited. L. the concluding sentence of par. II
the sanctioning of United SL.7.tes help to.Ejngland is plain
ly anti--Ger_-an (in the EnsUsh text even clearer than in
the German) . , - •
il.Since the text of the treaty, is already, in Washington
it has already had a damaging effect.. Oiie should try t(5
so obstruct it subsequently to such an extent that the
treaty will' not be -concluded. (Derinition of th'e J pcijj.ese
treaty interpretation, provisions for effectivenessde-
• pendence of the effectiveness of II, III, etc,).
lll*^iCild the treaty despite this still not be prevented,
care must be taken that J<.yci^ in reality comes back again
in the ranks. The luinimum vjould be that Japan extends its
assistance,to Germany on the same principles as' the United
States its assistance towards England,
• '.s
/s/ WEI2SAECKER
CEivTIFICiaTE 01 TRiTNSLAfI0N
^ ^ ^^'d 'I"*
21 January 1948
^X, Wolf Ton ECKAkDT, Civ.AGO A 1&5634, hereby
certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the
English and German languages and that the abdve' is
a true and correct translation of the,document No.
rG-4422 (A-E).
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Chief of Legal
Division
Ambassador Hitter
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Chiyf of Soon. Div.
Chief of Cultural Div,
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Chief of Deutschland
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Dirigent of Political
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of Reich Foreign
. Minister
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Telegran (secret code)
'Tokyo, 6 Hay 1941
Arrival: 7 May IS^'-l
To he used only
as sealed -oaper
11.10 S
1.00
?To. 685 of 6 May Most urgent I
'^ith reference to telegram ITo. 676 of 5 tfeiy.*
To he submitted to the Tteich Foreign Minister,
I he.d today a long conversati'^n with^fetsuoka to
whom I explained the points of view brought out in my
preceding telegram. Ilatsuote fully agreed with my
ideas and asked me to communicat? , to the Reich
Foreign Minister his concepti'^n ofthe present situation
as follov/s:
Yesterday he read the speech of the Fuehrer and
vras greatly i'.Tpressed by the firmness and wisdom of
its content. Against it the hysteric invectives of
Roosevelt seem to pr«ve that he completely lost his head.
Under the impression of the Fuehrer's speech Ifetsutka
sent, as he told me, through the Japanese Smbassy in
Berlin a telegran to the Reich Foreign Minister, of which
he gave me a copy.
Passing on to the general situation l-iatsuoka. stated
that it ^••as his intention to take up the American
proposal only after having induced the leading inner
political circles to agree with his interpretations.
Matsuoka supposes that the American proposal was probably
based upon a report sent to Vashington by the American
Ambassador in Moscov;, Hatsuoka has ?niown the Ambassador
for a long time and had a frank discussion with him when
ho returned via Moscow, The American Ambassador did not
Conceal his critical attitude towards Roosevelt and asked
- 1 -
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(page 1 of original cent;)
!Iatsuoka the fcllowing question.: I'/hat would Janan do .in
case the United States would enter into the Uar? He
answered that in such event Janan —under all circumstances
- woul^ also Immediately enter the V.'ar on the side of the
Axis-Powers.
(page 3 of original)
The Ambassador tried to weaken this statement enahle-him
to report
/to Washington that the entry of Japan into the War was
only a possibility. But Matsuoka en^jhasized that Japan
then would fi^t.
Returning to Toky# Ma.tsuoka v;as waiting already f»r
an American count-rbl«v/ and, on his arrival, found the
American proposal - (communicated to me) which cleverly
anticipates the requirements of certain inner political
circles. At first, not only the Industry but also the
Supreme Uaval Command weye inclined to seriously discussing
the American proposal. Matsuo^ca stated that he used the
time inbetvresn to influence the Admiral and especially to
point out t» him that the active circles of younger officers
of the Army and Ifevy Would decidedly r:ject such nolicy.
On Saturday the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior
Eiranuma, and th- Chief of the Armed Porces Jointly ex
pressed tg Mntsuoka their agreement with the provisional
ansvrer reported in ray preceding telegram and assured hira
of their confidence. However, Kiatsuoka supposes that the
discussion of the American proposal will bring about
tension with economic circles. Ho will try to prooeed
tactically in such a manner as to bind the United States
not to participate in the 1Duropean Uar because the
Fuehrer's speech gave him the impression that German
policy is pursuing this aim, Matsuoka himself has little
- 2 «
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(page 2 of original cont«)
hope in this respect hccauae he supposes that developments
in the United States \tfill move quickly to'-^rds the entry
into the "ar; at present he has the question examined if
in such case the patrolling activity of the American Kaval
forces, which results in the arVitrary establishment of an
American security zone, v/ould not call for Japan's protest.
He Would appreciate quick information on Foreign
Minister's attitude tc^ards American proposal, for
unavoidable inner political discussions.
Going on to the signature of the Ihissian-Japanese
Neutrality pact Matsuoka told mo that,when he left Berlin,
he did not yet think that completion would be possible.
He made this clear in his conversation with the Foreign
(page 3 of original) Minister and declared that he would take up the iratter
only if Russian readiness vras evident. In his opinion
the neutrality pact is the result of Russian anxiety
Concerning Germany. Hv found Stalin absolutely inclined
to peace. Stalin assured him that any bargaining of
Russia with the Anglo-Saxon Pow:;rs is out of question,
To prevent such bargaining was one of Ifetsuoka's motives
for signing the Neutrality pact. As Stalin told Matsuoka,
the Sorjot-Union did not accede to the Tripartite &.ct
because the Powers of this pact do not need Russian supnort.
But, if necessary, Russia would be ready for far-reaching
coop .ration with the Powers of the T.ripartlto Pjact. Upon
my remark, that the Sovjet-Unlon wanted to protect herself
against attacks from the rear and upon my question as to
what Japan wo">ld do in case of Germa.n-Russian conflict
and if the United States would supply Russia with war
materials via Vladivostock, Matsuoka replied as follows:
-3-
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(page 3 of original cont.) .
No Japanese Prime Minister or Poreign Minister would ever
tie atile to keep Japan neutral in co.se a conflict ^>et\ireen
G-eraan^/ and Russia should arise.« If that should hapo'^n,
physical necescitj' would force Japan to attack Russia
oh the side of G-ermany» No neutrality pact would change
that. Finally Matsuoka expressed the view that the entry
/
of the United States into the War might induce the Fuehrer
to resolve the Russian question "by force in order to get
hold of territories needed for supplies "because then .the
war would protahly "be drawn out. He personally is con
vinced of quic"k victory for German arms,
I thanked Matsuoka for his frank words and promised
to ask tho Heich Foreign Minister to communicato his
views as soon as possible.
It goes without saying that during our conversation
I continued my efforts to direct Japan's policy toward.s
Sin^pore in opoosition to the disturbing manoeUvers of
the United States and to the existing JapB.nese tendency
to look first of all to'-'ards Russia.
signed? '"^tt
I, Gastava Kanna, AGO B 3^^7991, hereby certify that I am
fully conversant in the English and German languages and
that the above is a true and correct translation of
doc^ument NG-
Gustava H=inna
't
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CONTIM^L
Telegram (secret code)
To be used only
as sealed matter
Tokyoj 10 liay 1941 1-20 II
/irrived: 9 Hay 1941 2140 Hours
•^'Is in the hands
of Reich Foreign
Hinister •
Initialled:
Chief of A.O.|_U_nder5_ec' of State j
Chief of__Politic^
Division
UndersGc'y of State,
Chief of Legal
Division
Ambassador Hitter
Chief of Personnel Div.
Chief of Econ. Div.
Chief of Cultural!- "
Chief of Press "
Chief of Doutschland
Division
Chief of Information
Division
Chief of Protocol Div.
•pirigent of Political
Division
Original Copy in hands
of Reich Foreign.
Minister
I iiJr-iJ/j'' I
No. 714 of, 9 Hay Host urgentl
Is to be submitted to the Reich Foreign Ilinister.
^lith reference to telegram of 6 Hay, No« 685^-
-Before today's opening meeting of the Llain Coia- '
mittee of the Tripartite Pact Hatsuoka had sent to me
for ixiformation whether an ans^/er concerning the American
proposal had already arrived from Berlin. After the
meeting he asked me again for information about this
matter. He added that, as the Japanese Ambassador in
Y/ashington reported, the United States is novj about to
malce grave decisions and that, therefore. Secretary of
State .Hull has repeatedly urged tlie necessity of an
immediate answer from Japan. Hatsuoka will have the fol
lowing questions cleared up by tlie Japanese Mbassador
in Washington with the American Government:
Is the United States ready to pledge itse3.f
1.) not to enter the European war, and
2.) to induce Chiang Kai-shek to take up direct
negotiations with Japan without participation of the
United States? Under this condition Japan ^vould be
willing to discuss the details of the American proposal^
i IiiWnirrMfflBario
TniJ'iSUiTIOlN OF LOCU^MIT KG ^hk'Sh
COKTii-it:p:Ij
(page 1 of trigitial cent.)
''hen I atressed a^ih ^ha.t the American pr»posal
pursued only the aim of preventing Japan frcm" advancing
in the South Seas and, ahove all against Singapore, Matsuokn
stated that und^^r no circumstances ^Jould he let his hands
hound in the Pacific. He would he ready on?i.y to
guarantee the indeprrndence cf the Philip-'ine Islands.
(page ? of original)
I told Hatsuoka it could happen that the measures
of the United States must he considered as acts tf
aggression even though they haf' n-^t entered the vtslv
formally. Ke replied that in this case too Japan would
derm herself hound to act as ally,
I ask for instruction hy trlegraph.
signed: Ott
I, Jane Lester, AGO X 046159, hereby certify that I am
fully conversant in the English and German languages and
the.t the ahove is a true and correct translation of
document UG - kk^k
Jane Lester
6
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i'xA.ivSLATiOH OF DOCUi'-iErJ^ ITq.
qfficf of -ceizf of counssl foe VAE CEIJC
teiegi-ara COJjTBjUEL
(open) to "be used only
as sealed ina.ttey
Special train,, 11 May 1941 - 23.30
Arrival: 11 May 1941 - S3.45
(code mark for secrecy)
Control number of the telegram: 567
Host urgent 1
Ciphered telegram (secret code)
To "be mrked as Ton Secret Me.terial.
Vfith reference to telegram No 734 of 11 I>fey.
I ask you to call on Mr. Matsuoltei to inform him of
Margin note:
Transmitted to Tokyo .the following communication concerning the American
under No 592 from
0,30 until 2,30 proposal of a secret-entente tietween Japan and the United
Telegram Control,
12 May. States and to give him at the same time-this communication
Litialled; W as memorandum:
The Reich Government has taken notice of the
comraunication of the Japanese Government concerning the
proposals made to it by the Government of the United States^
In view of the high in^jortance which perhaps is to he
attrfhuted to this natter for the present policy of the
Tripartite Pact as well as for the future of the nations
united hy this Pact, the Reich Govt:rnment expresses thanks
'^^ief of A.O. for having the opportunity to express its views about this
•Kidersec'y of State.
Chief of Eolitlcal offer of the United States. It wil?. explain its opinion
Dlv.
UndersGc'y of State, on this matter of such importance quite frankly.
Chief of Legal
Division " It is to be considered as a fundamental fact that the
Ambassador Hitter
Chief of Personnel Div, struggle which Germany and Italy are fighting out is a
Chief of Econ, Div.
Chief of Cultural Div. mortal combat, that however the issue will b® less
Chief of Press Div,
Chief 'of Deutschland importance for the future of Jauan. If Germany and Italy
Dtv.
• Chief of Information should "be defeated, Japan would have to face, within a
Div.
Chief of Protocol Div. very short time, an overwhelming Anglo-Saxon coalition,
Dirigent of Political
Riv. which would probably include Russia and perhaps also France
Original copy in hands
of Political Div, and which would oppose these powers against any
^'urther aspiration of Japan concerning her living sphere
- 7 -
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(page 2 nf original)
(Lebensraun) in l&st^rn A^iai The -Gernan Heich Governnent
thinks that the Japanese Government will agree with this
viewi It is obvious that just this high point of view
makes it desirable to hinder the entry of America into the
war^ IVhethor it is possible to achieve this end can be
judged with certainty only by the American Government
itself, For neither Germany nor Italy have done the least
thing against America which could motivate a nilitaiy
conflict. If nevertheless the policy of America and her
practical measures are driving towards war, then this is
the result of prejudiced decisions of those men who,
similarly to the happenings during the world war —
either for reasons of capitalism or in pursuance of wider
Imperialistic aims —think the moment proper to lead the
United States into a. new v;ar. Probably motives of domestic
policy too lead these men to such decisions, the entire
failure of the American economic policy, which is
unseparably connecte<^ with the name of the present President
Roosevelt, and the overwhelming influence of the Jewry,
its organization and above all its press, etc.
If this decision of the leading and responsible men
of America is definitive or should be definitive, it
would be their first purpose to facilitate the entry into
the war a^inst Germany and Italy by blowing up the
Tripartite Pact and by isolating these two Powersb Por
reasons of the domestic policy too^- it would be easier
in the United fltates to overcome the opposition against
the war, if Roosevelt" could prove that Japan for certain
reasons can be hindered — at least for some time — from
enterlng the war,.
Therefore,, if" it is to be supposed that the leading
men of the United States are determined to enter the war,
^.8 -
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.(rsage 3 6f original)
there is, if any, only.ohe neans to holi^. then hackj
namelyi /'
The Ibrutai and clear statenent that, whatever America
my cLo and whatever may "be the motives for the measures
she takes or whatever kind of measures she may apuly, her
entry into the v;ar will compel Japan too, to enter the wa.r
immediately. But even if such a positive decision to enter
the war should not yet exist in the United States, such
a statenent would confirm the view that a further gliding
off on the sloping way mast be stopned and avoided,
If, hov/ever, the President of the United States made
his proposal to Japan only for the tactical purpose to
create a favorable situation for the entry into the war,
because he hopes perhaps, that by proposing an agreement
between the United States and Jopan he can bring about an
uncertainty of the homogenous mood of the Japanese people,
then it is, to the mind of the Reich (Jovernnent, even more
necessary that the Japanese G-overnnent should deal with the
proposal both clearly as ^'ell as with tactical skill.
VvToether the proposal of the American President tries
at the same time to impose contractual restrictions upon
the future aspirations of Japan in Eastern Asia, the
Japanese G-overnment can naturally ap-oreciate best.
But generally speaking, the German Reich Government
cannot help thinking that it could be also a political
manoeuver of the American President who hopes that he
might easier convince and make rea.dy for the circles
opuosing war by a fictitious relaxation in the Pacific.
The sincerity of the American proposal can only be
judged if one considers the wording of the engagement not
to enter Into war "on its own initiative." It would well
•<r" tf r- )TRajTSIATinH 0? 3^017:1212 NO ITG ^54
^?>ViMinMilihf.iM. <, • .
(page 4 of original) .-,
Correspond to the tactics used "by Roosevelt up to now
to wage vrar in reality "by accumulating actually xxnneutral
•acts without formal declaration 6f wari thereby putting
the responsibility upon the Axis Povfers in lurope, and in
this way to enter the vrar and shift the initiative to the
other side. It is quite conceivable that Roosevelt
perhans hopes or "believes that he might divert in this vray
the scruples of those who think tha.t the contination of
the present policy must lead automatically to vrar, and
that then Japan ton would stand up as the enemy of Am:rica
in accordance with the Tripartite Pact, Por the President
could overcome "best the objections of these people if he
showed them a treaty which binds Japan not to enter the
war, provided the dext-rity of his policy could shift to
the Axis Pov^ers the blam^- for the initiB-tive of tho
U.S. entry into the vrar. The American President would
th\n be 'Encouraged in dealing with th^ circles opposing
war to continue just his present policy vrhlch then must
result auto':mtically in acts leading to war.
According to thes- obsor'"'ations - which are in no
way exhaustive - the O-erman Reich Government ventures to
submit to the Japanese Government tho following concent
concerning the ansv/er to be given to the American offer:
1. It is a nrincinlc of the nolicy of the Japanese
Go'^ ernrnvint tho.t an extension of the war should, be avnid.ed,
Por this purpose tho Japanese Government has joined in
the Tripartite Pact. If, therefore, the American Govern
ment hf-s the sincere d.5slre to avoid, its entry into the
war, vrhich —as the Japanese Government knovrs —could not
be caused by any acts com-iitted by the Axis Powers; this
desire corresponds entirely vrith the sane desire which
Induced the Japanes"^ Go-remmont to sign ths Tripartite Pact
• lii -
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(page 5 of original)
HoweV'er, the Japanese Go-^^rnnent mist declare v/ith regret
that Tip to now the attitude of the Unified States as it
appears in the utterances of fosp^hsihle politicians and
in the neasurcs of the loaders of the State, has dev-iated
Tnore and jnore fmn a r^al non-intervention. In this
respect the- Japanese Government mzt state that these acts,
which Japan cannot consider as neutral, were initiated
exclusively "by the United States.Th- Jr-r G''^vt.''o'*s
think that the continuation of such a policy can preserve
the peace. It must therefore state that a continuation
of this policy - Including, for instance,-the unlawful
control of a 'belligersnt by so-called patrol activity or
even the setting up of convoys — is to he consi<^ered as
an intended initiative to war and will accordingly oblige
Japan likewise to ent^r the war irinediately in any case.
That is the duty of Japan tov;ards her Tripartite Pact,
which has no nth-r purpose th».n to prevent a wider extension
of the unhappy struggle.
P.. If, however, it shoulJ^ be really the desire and
the intention of the American Government to avoid entry
into the war and to abstain consequently from all those
meesures which undoubtedly imoly the ch-aracter of an
initiative to bring about armec' conflict, the Japanese
Government will be rea''y to examine the details of an
agreement such as has bec-n proposed by the American
Govarnnent.
Because the treatment of this matter is of the highest
Importance for all nations of the Tripartite Pact, the
German Reich Government would be very grateful if the
Japanese Government, before sending ^ff its definite note,
would inform the German and Italian Governments of its
-.11 -
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contents and give them the opportunity to express their
views thereon.
(signer') Hihbentrop
I, iTane Lester, AGO X 046159,herehy certify that I am
fully conversant in the 2nglish and German language and
that the above is a true and correct translation of
document HG- 445^
Jane Lester
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Secret Reich flatter
Telegram
(Secret Code)
Foreign Office
Pol I M 990
arrived April 17 19h.l
Hexico April I6 19hl 9.^0 p.m.
Arrived 17 19Ul 9.00 a.m.
Nr. 225 from April I6,
Sealed matter.
x) Pol I M 9U7 secret Reich matter. Tfith reference to telegram of 12.U,
Nr. IhS^
Produced 2 pieces
Of those submitted
Nr. 1 to Pol, I U ,("Working copy)
- 2 Reich Foreign Minister
- 3 State Secretary
- Chief A.O,
- 5 Office Reich Foreign T-.Iinister
- 6 Chief Pol. Division
- 7 Chief Legal Division
- 8 Chief Personnel Divisien
- 9 Chief Economic Di\a.sion
- 10 Chief Cultural Division
- 11 Chief Press Division
- 12 Chief Protocal Division
- 13 Chief Germanj'" Division
- lU Dirigent of the Pol. Division
- 1^ Dirigent of the Economic Div,
16 Dirigent of the Legal Division
- 17 Dirigent of the Cultural Division
- 18 Personal Staff (He^.vcl)
- 19 Country Section
This is copy Nr. 1
for ^'hr. Kramarz
^0.000 (Fifty thousand) ^"Ss received,
Forvfarding ordered.
Richard,
Ruedt.
Express letter.
1. Dopy sent for information to O.K.^f.,
Section Defense II
Tdth referonco to letter of 10,U —
Nr. 656/11
Secret Comando matter. Section
Defense II by order to -
signed Krammarz
(initials) K 17/U
2, to bo taken to the filos
Secret Reich 'latter 2 Mexico
- 1 -
Mite
r. • •
mTaTl-"i3L--.'n"I1 OP' i:CT^Tl!T No.KG -4398-
0-' /HIFF '2^j30l|lS]y:.J'0RJ"ARj:R^
" GOiiTINinL
T0lear^_
(Sccrot Cod'?)
Secret Reich 'latter
Pol, I ?J 1085_
5
to Fir. Geygor
Hexioo, April 23 . 19Ul 9.58 p.m.
Arrived 2U . 19m 9.5°
Hr_, ^2 from__Aoril_22 "fith referoncG to telegram of
18. Nr. 168=^)
Pol. I5C 1728 G.
1839 G.
x) Pol. I M 10^9 Secret Reich llattor
Scaled matter.
the follov^ins is kno-.vn here about Agents, their activitics and their
ordering parties.
The list probably is inoomplctc because obr kno7;lcdgc is based up-'
on occasional and incidental observations.
1) Licutonant Colonel von Schlcobrucggo,
2) i^ajpr Nicolaus.
Both agents of the O.K.^". seem to have a rather large staff of co-
workers, technical office. One of the co-operators, Barko of Gorman
nationality, has, as vfas reported to me from Tampico, prosontod himself
to unauthorized people as confidence man of the O.K.'-?. Schlcebruggc him
self is supposed to have already asked recall from lloxico.
XT''
xx) Pol. I M7712 (Compare also telegraphic report nr. 268 of Nay 19U0
3. Merchant Horml:cs agent of a Njr, Herzog from Rromcn
(•apparently dcfonso office) furnishes ncvrs about armmment plants in the
U.S., is also active for Japanese scorot sondoo. (Compare also
tclegranhic report Nr. 268 of 'fey 29, 19U0)
Produced 7 copies
of those sutmitted
Nr. 1 Pol. I g (working copy)
" 2 Roich Foreign FtLnistcr
" 3 State Secretary Bank clerk Hilgort agent for Army
" I4 Office of the Reich Foreign corps Xin Hamburg for news service
Minister the United
" $ Chief Political Division
" 6 Amlxissador Ritter
I4.) I'.Icrchant Rckowski, agent for the
O.K.N, (Haller) in the United States
works, together with Irish Organizati
for explosives, for sabotage in
am\inition plants and on ships*
29U83U
. 2 -
Vi'Mif-'aW
#'^ •is is lib. 1 '
TR;i^iSL--,TIOi' 07 LOCUTI^IT No.r^G -4398
ooi/muEr
for I'.'Ir, Kramerz
States, Indcscreet appcar-anee, becausoj not long
ago he vfas soon intoxicated in a public place which
was under American espionage control. I am afraid
that, amongst other things, his being by the Gorman
Bank is the reason for attacking it as a center for
espionage,
6) Horchant Huge, agent for Army Corps KI
Hannover, collects news from Mexico, As Consul in
Guadalajara reported not long ago, he recently
bostcd about' secret orders.
Several of the persons named here have already
•been marked as secret agent by local and American
press. As Hoxico is full of Anaric<an Spies which
is generally knoim, I believe it impossible to keep
Gorman activities a secret, and consequently the
protection of Gcrmandom is rendered more difficult
for nc.
Ruodt
Secret Reich Matter Mexico
29U83?
,-'wjh>W'
I'rS^lTtioij of- L0C"i:j-'tijt hqj^^ ^k3^B
£--I 1 OO^eO'-TjS'L_FORJ^AR_OHB;ffi£
cmrniwi ~
Secret. Reich Ofettor
Tolcgr?.m
(Secret Ch, V.)
Foreign Office
Pol, I M iiU7.
arrived 30 April 191+1
liexicQ April 29 i9lll —=r- p,^.
Arrived 30 1914-1 5#30 a,m»
x) Pol I M1085 g Rs.
Rat.
•".''fith rcfcrGncc to telegram Nr. 252x)
person named
of April 23^ lil under chiffer I
and II
left Mexico for Japan on April 27.
Prepared in duplicate
of those distributed
Hr.
ti
u
5
6
7
1 Pol. I M (competent department)
2 Reich Foreign Minister
3 State Secretary
Chief A.O.
Office of Reich Foreign Minister
Chief Pol.
Chief Legal
" 8 Chief Press
® 9 Chief Economic
" 10 Chief Cultural
" 11 Chief Pors-onncl
" 12 Chief Par'o-bocjal
" 13 Chief Germany Division
" li+ Dirigent of the Political Di-'dsion
" 15 Dirigent of the Economic Division
" l6 Dirigent of the Legal Division
" 17 Dirigent of the Cultural Division
" 18 Staff of press
" 19 Countrv Section
Ruodt
Hr, Goycr
'List of Agents "
handwritten: for Mr, Kram, Secret Reich Matter 2 !!oxico
. 4 -
•J'imtMf'r I litiii
mSecret Heich tJatter
TR\KS1^VTI0N OF LOCUVIENT ho. I3G- k39S
OFFlCF^GF CHTEF OF_COi:^lL_FOfi_WAH_CRIMES
COT...'?t:ktED
(Secret Code)
Mexico May 2»19iil - 6.U5 p.m»
Arrived 3 — 9.25 a.in.
Nr. 278 from 2.5.
x) at Pol, 1 g,
xx) not yet arrived
Secret,
Nr. 1167
URGENT
folloTVing up Telegram
of 29. Nr. 263 x)
X
Pol I 'i IIU7 g.RSo i Ref,
The day after Rekowski had left American Embassy made inquires at
the Hotel about his "where abou"bs. The next day -the liexican police appeared
there ivith a v/arrant.
The local daily "Excelsior" of April 30 commen'fcs upon Reko"Wsld. *s
departure as German "spy". His female covv'orker here has been "warned
anonymously, ^
Once more I point out danger of acti"^/ity Agents in 'iexico for
our policy. As can be seen in Telegram Nr. 277Xx^ 2, Rekowski*3
ac"ti"vities are continued from here.
Produced 10 pieces
Of those submitted
Nr. 1 to Pol i g (working copy)
2 Reich Foreign yinister
- 3 S'bate Socr0"bary
U Office of Reich Foreign I-inistcrr
5 Ambassador Ritter
6 Chief Political Division
- 7 Chief Economic Divi-Sion
8 Chief Press Di"vision
9 Chief Personnel Division
- 10 Dirigent Political Division
This is copy nr. 1
for ISr. Kramarz
-,5 -
Ruedt.
to ""Ir. Geyser
(initials) K
Secret Reich "'Matter 2 Mexico
29U839
I
imu
Tirt'-.r-isi^.Tiori of'":^ocu'ENt No. ng-4398
CONTir^lEL
Secr>jt Reigli
T6_le£i;-Qi^
( Secret Cg^e)
iviexico, ^k-Y 2, 19
Arrive-^ i 3, 194^
3-Q.3Q P.m*
11.45 a,in. Foreign Office
^ol, I M 1108
Nr_j_ 271 Z'_2i5i.
*) Pol. I M.
lo35 secret Reich matter
is attache'-"
_Secrejt
With reference to ''•'•'elegram of 23r' Rr. 277 *)
iP
(Initialie-®
K.4.5.) Richar' for OKW.i Haller:
Thanks for support. Embarkation arrange'" sun'"ay.
Successor Carlos Vogt born Iiov. 1st 1904 ^k>rb(ljeckar)
iTfexican, nationalize" since 193hi' -"omizile" in^'^-exico.
Arrange" it in such v.;ay th~t connections v^'ith "Vogt
remain as before, meaning coble to Aickar* by -ay of legatio.
To avoi'" "anger I am anxious to appear in the U. S.
a little as possible.
Confi-'ence men for regular Mcxiean-communici-tion,
J» Mac Carthy
Tim Conaty
'iony Cribben.-
Illegal boru^r troffio is carrie/-" out by Fathe.
Char Ids (jraster) Ron^, i'exas. Signs of recogni
tiom arc. picture postal car'-"s, to be ha" here,
Ero'='uce--" in 2 copies '
istributec;
iMr, 1 to Pol, I M
(working cople)
2
;i 3
a
u
• 5
II 6
;l 7
li 3
il 9
.1 10
it U
Minister
Foreign Minister
to Chief of the
Political riv,
to Chief of the
Piv,
to Chief of the
i^iv.
to Chief of the
aic tiv,
to Chief of the
tural liv,
to Chief of the
i'iv.
Fxcl"sively written communications
Cuo'^alcipe -"el Monte,
- 6 .
•ill •• B'l- iii^viYJrt'iwitiiif i iHflmi iiii f '•fci' ii n lirtia ^
•vJ
.4 .
• -411
w.'
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TK-'SL-'-TIOL- 0? •^0C11-TlI;T Ijo, KG- 4398
COKTIMUEL
which you will hcve to fix*
Ifoncy contributions receivfe--- by Legatioi-
ftave been partly
Ko , 12 to Chief of the •^"rotOQolI
liv,
Germany13 to Chief of the
i^iv.
a 14 to xjirigent of- the loli-
tical L'iv,
it 15 to L^irigent of the Eco- •
nonic i-iv,
11 16 to L-irigent of the Legal
i^iv.
ti 17 to nirigent of the Gultural
I/iv.
11 18 to the Personal Staff
( Hewel)
II 19 to the country section
This is copy No. 1
Secret Reich Ifctter
Mexico 294841
(pai.e 2 of original)
Pistribut6fi. further payment ^ 10000 next veek. The anount left over
^ 30000, safeguar'e,.- in Llexioo, to avoi-- aver payments. Everything else
vivQ voce.
Rue-'t
Kote:
ForwoP'^ t.'^ by secrtt Teletypfc to G,
Control of telegrams, 4*5*41'
-7 -
irt'i il'liii rru'l'ft'l "iTM^Tlrt II II II m 'ii
' ''T-^--.' i''" ••• "iK "x' -'
m^SUTIOI-: O'F "^OCUvfl-iT I^io. ljG-4398
COl^iTIMlLEl
Secr.et Reich Ji%tter.
Tel^gr£iii\
('Secj:.et Ch;V^, )
Is be used only
as seals'' matter
Mexico,lvlcy 29,1941 11=3.6 p.m.
Arrive-^ " 301 IO»45 ^om.
Foreign Office
Pol. I M 1651 secret Reii
letter
Secret
Arrjjjrcff May 3I
(Inclosares: Copies:)
29^i
Richar-" reports for Haller OIv'\
"U.S.^x. man at pres^-nt in Mexico an' reports;
Activity greatly curtaile- by strict vigilance rules. Last
results: In Boston a Merchan-" I.'Iarine-estroye" by fire,Forest
fires in Jersey, Interruption of nie'..ting of ''.ar-mongers. Ircnrr
organization in ISil interested to knoi'/ what happen-' to Russel,
an-' who acts for us in lrelan-". (Leave it to you if an answer-,
convinient).
irenorganization is suppose-' to be in contact with ""^r.
Scholz, Boston, tlirough Irish Professor Havard University^
an-" •."•ishe-' -"irect contact v?ith Serman organizations in
Irenorganization is suppose- to have outfitte-' 2 ships with
t-rovision: names an-' time of -'eparture are going to be report-
e--'.
Formula for » S+inkbombe^ for -'isturbance of War monger'
meeting purchase-'., Pai-® ^ five thousan-" (5000) un-'er the
con-'ition that nev/spaper clippings about achievements at time
in cjuestion shoul" be brought to me at next Mexico trip.
I hope to be able to satisfy you.
Rue'"t#
xrcuce-^ in 10 copies
distributed:
No, 1 to •'^ol.Ig (working, copy)
2 to Reich •'•'oreign Mnist^r
3 to State Secretary
4 to Office of the Reich Foreign
Minister
5 to Ambassa-or Ritter
6 to Chief of the Political
iNiO,
1-^0,
Ho,
No,
No,
No.
No,
No,
riv.
7 to Chief of the Economic Liv,
to Chief of •'^ress Liv,
Personal Liv.to Chief of
No.10 to the Lirigent of the
Political Liv,
This is No. 1
to KramaEz
liii riiiTiifrilfif^Vli
-8-
ENL
Mexico
Secret R 2
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OFFICE OF U. S, CHIEF OF GOl"NSEL
TELEC21AM
(Code)
Special Train VTestfalen No, 707, 10 July 1941, 2i51 P.M.
Arrival: 10 July 1941, 4:00 ?M,
1. Code Office AA No. 634
2, Diplogerma Tokio
Telegram in code (Secret code system)
To: Ambassador personally.
* 4: % 4! %
(Page 24953
« « • •4,) Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese
Ambassador in Moscow for conveying the cable report. It would be convenient
if we could keep on receiving news from Russia this way, lo summing up,
I would like to say: I have now, as in the past, full confidence in
the Japanese Policy, and in the Japanese foreign minister, first of all
because the present Japanese government would really act inexcusably toward
the future of its nation if it would not take this unique opportunity to
solve the Russian problem, as well as to secure for all times its expansion
to the South and settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported
by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect cIobg to collapse, a
report which coincides with our own observations as far as we are able to
Judge at the present v/ar situation, it is simply impossible that Japan does
not solve the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her
military preparations are completGd.
It is, of course, also in our interest that Japan wants to secure for
herself further possessions in the South, Indo-China, etc., Just as every
measure of Japan directed toward expansion is principally welcomed by us,
I shall give you detailed instructions, within the near future, relative
to the consequences which might, and no doubt will, result from the
occupation of Iceland by American military forces, and the attitude which we
will take toward Japan in this oonnoction. As directive for talks we can
advise you already today that the sending of American military forces to the
support of England into a territory which has been officially announced by us
as combat area, shows not only Roosevelt's aggressive intentions, but the
fact of the intrusion of American military forces into the combat area
to the support of England is in itself an aggression against Germany and
Europe, After all, one cannot enter a theater of war in which two armies
are fighting, and Join the army of one side without the intention of
shooting and without actually doing so, I do not doubt for a moment that
in case of the- outbreak of hostilities between Germany and America,
In which case today already it may be considered as an absolutely established
fact that only America will be the aggressor, Japan will fulfill her
obligations, as agreed upon in the Three Rower Pact. However, I ask
you to employ all available means in further insisting upon Japan's entry
into the war against Russia at the soonest possible date, as I have
already in my note to Matsuoka, The sooner this entry is
it is. The natural objective still remains that.
Lands on the Trans Siberian railroad, before winter starts,
p 4. f collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three Power^ct states in the world will be so gigantic, that the question of
England s collapse or the total destruction of the English islands,
respeo "vely, ?rill only be a matter of time. An America totally isolated
rom e res of the world would then be faced with our taking possession
o e remaining positions of the British empire which are important
1
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for the Three Power Pact coimtries, I have the iinshakable conviction
that a carrying through of the nev/ order as desired by us will be a
matter of course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the
countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and encounter
every action of the Americans with the same weapons. I ask you to report
in the near future as often as possible and in detail on the political
situation there.
NOTE:
RIBBENTROP
Transmitted to Embassy in Tokio
under No. 1018
Telegram control, 10 July 1941,
CERTIFICATE OF TR/ii^SIATIOH
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2896^PS
29 November 1945
I, LUDWIG BARTJ'^ AN, 1/4, 37446052, hereby certify that I am
thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages} and that
the above is a true and correct translation of Document No, 2896-PS.
- 2 -
• • ail ii r> -
LUDWIG VjARWM
T/4, 37446052
mv.,
TEANSIATIOU 01* DOCUMBITT STo, lJG-1434
55^ CB^QI GMM il5LCnT®EL_P^JA2_CEIlIS.
5.t^ =: S^CLi, 505. Berlin,- 11 August 1941
Buring tho last few days| wo had already rocoived information
from Vichy throur-^h Dr. ^laus on EOOSBVELT's plan for intervention
to hring ahout peace through so-called arbitration, mentioned in
yesterday^s telegraphic report from Washington, B"® 2675. In order to
obtain further data oh tho subject, I enquired of THGMSEL", the
ambassador in Washington, wl^at he knows of the alleged EOOSEVELT ^lan.
My enquiry crossed with TH®MSEW*s report, montionGd above.
Wo should, in my opinion, consider the problem of whether it
Would be possible i^ ^orae way to upset this alleged BOOSBVELT ijampaign"tya
an^aign in t£of recommend that suggestions be requestedcountorw;
from Dr, MBGrBBLE,
Transmitted herewith to the
Eeiuh Minister for Foreign Affairs,
ie^Gthar_jwith ioieiyp.o_
• (signed) WEIZSABCEBH
Ms. ch. Il/S Br, u T H
• 5EHTiFI.CA!lS ilF_TM]5IA31I5IL
7 January 1948
I, Beryl C. BBSWICK, AG-O No. D 427459, herewith certify, that
I am a duly appointed translator for the G-erman and English languages
and that the above is a true and correct translation of the document
No, NG--1434.
Beryl C. BBSWIGK
ago Nc. D 427459
^ 1 ^
"EHP"





























































